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Abstract
In 2008 the Federal government enacted a Neighborhood Stabilization Program
(NSP) to address the neighborhood effects of the late-2000s foreclosure crisis. Congress
subsequently funded a second and third NSP. This research employs mixed methods to
examine the effectiveness of the first round of the NSP in three Florida jurisdictions. The
results are analyzed within the larger context of substantive housing theory and federal
housing policy. The success of the program is evaluated using a mixed-scanning
procedural planning theoretical framework.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Federal efforts to address the foreclosure crisis at the community level have had
mixed results. The current foreclosure crisis impacts households, neighborhoods, and the
national economy. At the neighborhood level, a concentration of foreclosures can cause a
deterioration of neighboring home values and increase vacancies. High vacancy rates and
disinvestment in a neighborhood undermine its vitality and create a vicious cycle of
decline. This process is called the contagion effect of foreclosure.
In 2008, the federal government enacted the Neighborhood Stabilization Program
(NSP) to address the contagion effect of foreclosure. The program was implemented
through local governments. Supporters of the program claim that over three years the
three rounds of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program have created 88,000 jobs, and
handled 33,000 properties.
This research examines whether the NSP effectively alleviates the neighborhood
impacts of foreclosure. It also examines the relationship between the goals of federal
housing policy, and the realities of local implementation. Hopefully this exploration of a
particular policy relating to neighborhood level community development will aid
practitioners in future policy implementation, aide policy makers crafting empirically
grounded policy, and indicate opportunities for more robust scholarly treatment of the
NSP.
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In the next chapter, I summarize the existing literature on the neighborhood
stabilization program and point to the contribution this research will make to that body of
literature. The first part of the literature review follows an historical chronology. In order
to provide the context of the NSP the chapter begins with an overview of the economic
and financial conditions that created the foreclosure crisis. The background leads to the
financial crisis of 2007 and the collapse of the secondary mortgage market. At that point
the literature review narrows, segueing through the rapid rise in foreclosure triggered by
the market correction into a more substantive discussion of the neighborhood effects of
concentrated foreclosure. The contagion effect of foreclosure is a catchall term that
encompasses the cumulative spatial, economic, and social effects of foreclosure. I survey
five specific effects indicated in the literature: magnified declines in home values,
increased crime, effects on education and families, a diminished tax base, and aggregate
societal cost. Following the outline of the foreclosure deluge and its origin in the
financial markets I describe the various policies designed to respond to the crisis,
specifically the NSP and its implementation. The literature review concludes with an
acknowledgment of alternative policy proposals intended to address the neighborhood
effects of foreclosure, vacancy, and abandonment.
Identifying a procedural-planning theory provides the necessary evaluative tools
to understand the substantive neighborhood policies examined here. Chapter Three
outlines the theoretical framework used to analyze and interpret the examination of the
NSP. It begins with a review of the rational planning model, also known as synoptic
planning, articulated by Edward Banfield. Even as Banfield described the process of
planning and policy implementation, Charles Lindblom asserted that agents of public
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policy were constrained by the political process and must cast off any delusions of
comprehensiveness instead opting to “muddle through” a series of small incremental
movements. After discussing Lindblom’s incrementalist alternative to synoptic planning,
Chapter Three introduces the further refinement of procedural planning theory by Emitai
Etzioni, mixed-scanning. A variant of mixed-scanning is adopted as the analytical
structure for this work. The balance of the chapter discusses broad substantive housing
policy over the last half century before narrowing the focus on the rationale for the NSP.
Chapter Four reviews the technical administration of the Neighborhood
Stabilization Program in Florida. Although Congress and the administration allowed
grantees wide discretion to choose techniques for implementation, there are
programmatic prescriptions and prohibitions. Many of the programmatic constraints are
adopted through the primary funding mechanism, the Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG). The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has
guidelines in place for CDBG grantees, most of which apply to NSP grantees. In Florida,
NSP grantees have chosen a variety of strategies for implementation that go beyond the
purchase, renovation and resale of distressed single family homes. The variety of
technical practices employed by Florida jurisdictions reflects differing staff capacities,
local real estate market conditions, and diverse local political cultures. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the most technically challenging aspect of the NSP, the
congressional directive that 25% of the initial funds and all programmatic income benefit
low-income households.
The research design is in Chapter Five. The chapter begins with the research
question, whether the NSP has effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure.
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The question is followed by the working hypothesis, that the NSP has modestly contained
price declines and that it has not contained other contagion effects. The chapter also
identifies the challenge of defining and operationalizing foreclosure. Most of Chapter
Five outlines the study area and the data sources employed in this research. The chapter
also includes the methods used to collect and treat quantitative and qualitative data.
The quantitative analysis is in Chapter Six. The Chapter begins by further
elaborating on the methodology introduced in Chapter Five. Then the observations are
presented for three neighborhoods receiving NSP funds, and three similar neighborhoods
not receiving NSP funds. In each neighborhood, distressed and non-distressed homes are
identified. First, the baseline pre-crisis average value for each home is identified. Then,
the relationship between the appraised values of the distressed properties, and appraised
values of the non-distressed properties, is measured using the mean ratio of difference of
intrinsic value. Post crisis observations are taken on the same property using 2011
appraisals. These data are then treated with regression analysis using Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The results indicate that the limited sample is
not statistically significant, implying that the findings within the sampled neighborhoods
may not reflect the general trend in the entire universe of NSP neighborhoods. Within the
examined neighborhoods, there is no clear relationship between NSP spending and losses
of intrinsic home values. Moreover, the descriptive data imply that there may not even be
a deleterious contagion effect of foreclosure measurable as a decline in appraised
property values. In at least two of the neighborhoods examined here, non-distressed home
owners actually experienced increases in relative value when their neighbors experienced
foreclosure.

4

Chapter Seven consists of case studies of ten neighborhoods, the six included in
the qualitative analysis and four others. The neighborhoods are located in three counties
in different regions of Florida. Each county is presented as a section within the chapter
with an overview of the local cultural and economic context. Each neighborhood is
introduced with a summary of its demography, household tenure, and housing stock.
These figures are then illustrated with personal observations of the neighborhood
condition and the state of the housing stock with particular focus on properties in close
proximity to NSP purchased housing units.
The final chapter consists of conclusions about the effectiveness of the
Neighborhood Stabilization Program. The chapter contains three parts. In the first
section, I acknowledge the limitations of this research, specifically the elements of the
research design that limit the generalizability of the findings. In the second section I
summarize and synthesize the findings of this research linking them to the theoretical
framework outlined in Chapter Three. The final section includes policy implications. The
policy implications discussion points out some of the strengths and weaknesses of NSP
implementation in Florida and indicates some of the lessons that might inform future
neighborhood policy and planning practice.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The federal government has implemented several policy responses to address the
ongoing foreclosure crisis in the United States. They fall into three broad categories.
First, are macro-level policies aimed at preventing further high-risk lending, this category
includes the re-regulation of the secondary mortgage market. Second, are micro-level
foreclosure prevention programs like the Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP) which help homeowners facing financial hardships keep their homes. Finally,
there are programs that seek to deal with the impacts of foreclosure on communities and
correct the negative externalities of foreclosure. The Neighborhood Stabilization Program
(NSP) is in this category. The rationale for enacting the NSP is grounded in the
proposition that there is a ‘contagion effect’ of foreclosure. The contagion effect is the
increased likelihood of mortgage default and other negative indicators of neighborhood
health that occur around a foreclosed or abandoned property.
Florida, one of the states hardest hit by the crisis, provides an excellent
opportunity to observe the efficacy of federal policy interventions to solve neighborhood
level problems. In May 2009, news reports indicated that 11% of Florida mortgages were
in some stage of foreclosure, making the most severely affected state in the nation at the
time (Howley, 2009). In the past three years California, Nevada, and Florida have
alternated the title of most foreclosed. This research will focus on the deployment of the
NSP in select Florida jurisdictions. The results will demonstrate whether the program has
effectively mitigated the contagion effect.
6

Since 2007, the United States has experienced a foreclosure crisis. A sharp rise in
foreclosure rates and an attendant decline in real estate values characterize the crisis. In
response, the federal government has enacted a host of policy interventions in housing
and financial markets. This chapter examines the scholarly literature treating one aspect
of the policy response, neighborhood stabilization. The literature review has eight parts.
First, it identifies the two divergent trends in the literature. Then, it examines the origin
of the foreclosure crisis as it is presented in the literature. After introducing the crisis, it
explains the academic consensus regarding the existence of the contagion effect of
foreclosure, and the disagreements over its size and scope. Then the literature review
introduces reports of the government’s policy responses to the crisis, and places
neighborhood stabilization within a larger administrative framework. Specifically, it
examines the current state of research on the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)
and its efficacy. Then it examines scholarly treatment of the Obama Administration’s
macro-level deployment of the policy as well critical views from within the academy.
Finally, it specifies opportunities for research.
The Financial Crisis The mid 2000’s housing bubble is just one of two high-risk
mortgage bubbles in as many decades (Immergluck, 2009a). The first subprime boom and
bust occurred during the mid-to-late 1990s. A global savings surplus drove both bubbles,
as well as the tech-bubble sandwiched between them (Bernanke, 2005; Immergluck,
2009c). Between 1993 and 1998, the total value of Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities (RMBSs) grew from $35 billion to $150 billion (Immergluck, 2009a;
Schwartz, 2010). Investor demand for RMBSs reversed the traditional asymmetries in the
lending relationship – in which the borrower sought to conform to the lenders
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conservative underwriting requirements – and incentivized the marketing of easy credit to
homeowners (Schwartz, 2010). Although the period saw the standardization of
‘subprime’ lending, this first bubble focused primarily on stripping equity from existing
homeowners whose valuations were based on ordinary appreciation and paying down
their original purchase-money loans.
One of the chief characteristics of the expansion of sub-prime mortgage finance is
the entry of non-bank originators into the market (Immergluck, 2009a). Because these
institutions did not accept deposits, they were not subject to the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) and other regulations that require fair lending terms and
prohibit targeting particular neighborhoods for more expensive financial products
(Immergluck, 2009c; Schwartz, 2010). As a result, certain households and communities
disproportionately experienced the individual and community impacts of predatory
subprime defaults. For example, by 1998, 51% of home loan refinancing in Black
majority communities was subprime. In White majority neighborhoods, subprime lenders
accounted for only 9% of refinancing (Immergluck, 2009c).
The racial disparity in the first sub-prime boom (1990s) is enormous. According
to Immergluck, 9% market share in White neighborhoods amounted to a major increase
in the incidence of subprime lending. The growth of subprime terms in minority
neighborhoods, more than five times the high levels experienced in White
neighborhoods, marks a major shift in retail home-loan finance market. As financial
markets devised techniques for spreading risk and repackaging subprime financial
products, the change would have wide-ranging implications for secondary markets, nonminority neighborhoods, and the global economy. Immergluck does not disaggregate the
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statistics for White neighborhoods, but other research indicates that the victims of
predatory lending are frequently drawn from the poor, the elderly, and those with low
educational attainment (Martin, 2010). Taken together, it is likely that society’s most
vulnerable groups, spatially segregated minorities, the poor, the aged, and the poorly
educated formed a market niche for subprime loan originators throughout the 1990’s.
As the economic growth of the 1990’s slowed, sub-prime default rose steadily
(Immergluck, 2009c). However, because real estate prices did not fall, and the broader
society did not immediately feel its effects; the first wave of subprime defaults did not
trigger a national economic crisis. Surprisingly, the losses from default did not reduce
investor appetite for securities based on sub-prime mortgages.
In the mid-2000’s, subprime residential financing went mainstream. After 2002
the growing oversupply of money from global capital markets surged into U.S. residential
mortgage origination. Larger loans with “exotic” terms expanded consumer buyingpower (Immergluck, 2009c). This greater buying power led to a speculative rise in real
estate prices. The result was a “virtuous cycle” of sharply rising home values
(Immergluck, 2009c, p.342). Households needed to borrow more money to purchase a
home, and could purchase more-expensive homes because they were able to borrow more
money. Many entered the housing market in a rush fearing they would be priced out of
the market if they did not act quickly (Schwartz, 2010). Put simply, consumers borrowed
more, and more often. There was much greater demographic and spatial diversity in the
second wave of subprime lending than in the first.
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBSs) convert individual home loans
into tradable investments. In order to market the product, investment brokers – far
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removed from mortgage origination – needed to find the right mix of sub-prime loans
(which boast highly profitable cash flows), and prime loans (which offer security but
lower returns). In order to avoid the risks presented by an RMBS carrying too many subprime loans, brokers developed the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). In the
unregulated private market, CDOs contained a mix of high and low risk RMBSs. These
investments were rated and priced through a technique called “tranching” (Schwartz,
2010, p.71). The phrase is derived from the French word tranche, meaning trench, slice,
or portion. A tranche is a random sample of the mortgages that comprise an RMBS or
CDO. The entire instrument is then rated and priced based on the sample (Immergluck,
2009c; Schwartz, 2010). In this way, high-risk mortgages are offset by lower risk
mortgages. Brokers then price and sell the entire package according to the market value
of the low-risk mortgages. The availability of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) further
obscured the risks of default by the actual homeowners, who provided the cash flows that
gave these investments their face value (Immergluck, 2009c).
A Credit Default Swap is an insurance agreement in which the buyer pays a
“premium” to the seller in exchange for a guarantee that the seller will pay the buyer the
full face value of the insured asset when an “event” occurs. In this case, the event is the
massive default by the mortgagors whose loans are part of an RMBS/CDO. Credit
Default Swaps were entirely unregulated in the United States from their inception in the
mid 1990’s until the 2007 financial crisis. Apparently, sellers are not required to keep
cash reserves to validate their obligations (requiring the Federal Reserve to inject the
largest seller of Credit Default Swaps with $85 billion of cash in 2008). The most
puzzling feature of CDS is that the buyer is not required to own an interest in the insured
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asset. In other words, an investor can “bet” that investments held by other individuals and
institutions will decline in value. Together, all of these innovations encouraged the
investment of the world’s surplus savings in instruments ultimately collateralized by the
United States housing market (Immergluck, 2009c; Bernanke, 2005).
Through CDOs, subprime loans spread their toxicity throughout the world of
housing finance. As street level origination moved away from the conservative
underwriting requirements of traditional lenders to high-pressure sales offices at nonbank (i.e. unregulated) institutions, banks feared a loss of market share (Immergluck,
2009a). Many banks and financial institutions, too conservative to involve themselves
directly in the high-risk market, created Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to
purchase and hold CDOs (Schwartz, 2010). According to Schwartz, parent institutions
funded these entities with short-term loans, which were repaid from the CDOs’ regular
cash flows (2010, p.78). The flow of money stopped abruptly once the default rate spiked
in 2007. The Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac –
also purchased CDOs in order to add a greater portion of low-income homeowners to
their portfolios. The availability of easy credit through subprime lending greatly
diminished low-income homebuyer demand for conforming loans. As a result, Fannie
Mae needed to purchase high-risk CDOs to meet its congressional mandates to expand
working class homeownership (Schwartz, 2010).
In 2007, massive mortgage defaults triggered a sudden revision of CDO credit
ratings (Immergluck, 2009a; Schwartz, 2010). Consequently, the financial markets
revalued the investments. The devaluation wreaked havoc on the global financial system
and led to the failure of CDS schemes as well as the injection of government money into
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financial markets. At the other end of the pipeline, borrowers who intended to refinance
out of the unrealistic terms of their mortgages could no longer access easy credit.
Moreover, plummeting home values and rising unemployment exacerbated the problem
and led to a wave of “strategic defaults” (Guiso et al., 2009). As loan servicers began to
foreclose upon defaulting mortgagors, it quickly became apparent that the real estate
collateralizing a substantial portion of the world’s financial-capital was no longer worth
the debtors’ obligations. Institutional losses reached several billion dollars as the
American economy entered recession in 2007.
The Foreclosure Crisis Since 2007, the nation has faced a sharp increase in
foreclosure filings. While the collapse of the housing market triggered a larger economic
downturn across the nation (and around the world), the foreclosure crisis is largely
localized. The flurry of market activity in the mid-2000’s triggered a boom in new
construction which led to severe oversupply in certain parts of the country. The collapse
of the housing market largely mirrors this trend. Just five states (California, Florida,
Arizona, Illinois and Michigan) account for more than 50% of the nation’s foreclosures
(Harding et al, 2009; Kingsley et al, 2009; Realty Trac, 2011). Even within these states,
the incidence of foreclosure is unevenly distributed, most severely affecting poor
neighborhoods and newly built areas (Strom & Reader, 2011). The national foreclosure
rate peaked in October of 2009 (Schwartz, 2010). Nonetheless, communities are still
dealing with the aftermath of the crisis.
The Contagion Effect of Foreclosure According to Kai-Yan Lee, former senior
research associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, foreclosure affects
neighborhoods in three ways: 1) supply; 2) valuation; and 3) blight (Lee, 2008). The

12

impact of supply is obvious; in the idiom of economics, supply exceeds demand leading
to lower price equilibrium. Blight refers to qualitative decline that flows from deferred
maintenance and the opportunities for criminality that come from vacant and neglected
homes (Kingsley et al, 2009; Lee, 2008). Valuation denotes the practice of determining
the sale price and taxable value of a property based on recent nearby sales, or
“comparables” (Lee, 2008). Research reveals that the market substantially discounts
distressed homes (Wassmer, 2010). This discount infects the neighboring non-distressed
homes, causing homes in close proximity to a foreclosure to experience a decline in value
greater than the average decline in value for similar homes in the same market (Lauria,
1998; Lee, 2008; Wassmer, 2010; Immergluck & Smith, 2006).
A single distressed property is oncogenic and infectious. The aggregate effect of a
concentration of distressed properties renders a neighborhood unhealthy and diseased.
Much of the literature describes the community effects of foreclosure in epidemiological
terms. This is not new; researchers have observed the “community contagion effect”
since at least the mid-1990s (Lauria, 1998). In fact, Ben Bernanke, the Princeton
economist turned Federal Reserve chairman, observed in 1983 that credit defaults
(including mortgage loans) during the early years of the Great Depression led to more
defaults and prolonged the economic crisis of the 1930s (Bernanke, 1983).
Ceteris paribus, a single foreclosure will lead to a reduction in the value of
neighboring properties. Additionally, the current crisis appears to have amplified the
effect of foreclosure on neighborhood property values (Wassmer, 2010). Since 2007, the
loss per non-distressed household has increased. In other words, the current contagion
effect is larger than in a normally functioning market (Wassmer, 2010, p. 23-24).

13

Wassmer found that it is several times larger, while others have found more modest
increases. Although there is considerable disagreement over the size of the contagion
effect, researchers consistently find that, 1) it exists; and 2) its observed impact is greater
than normal in the date range of 2006-2011 (Wassmer, 2010; Immergluck & Smith,
2006; Schuetz, Been, & Ellen, 2008). Wassmer found that the sale of a single distressed
property led to an aggregate “$1.1012 billion reduction in the price of non-REOs over
[an] 18 month period observed in the Sacramento area” (2010, p. 23). Real Estate Owned
(REO) is a commonly used abbreviation to denote properties owned by financial
institutions. An REO sale occurs when a homebuyer purchases a bank-owned home.
While there is an academic consensus distressed homes are contagious, it is
difficult to determine how far reaching their effects are (Harding et al, 2009). Many
researchers have found that a foreclosure adversely affects the value of immediately
neighboring properties. While there are other negative externalities flowing from
foreclosed and abandoned homes, the decline in property values is most easily
quantifiable and formed a major part of the rationale for enactment of the NSP in public
discourse.
Home Values Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, tested the assertion that foreclosure
depresses neighboring home values. They found that there was a significant correlation
between foreclosure and the decline in the value of immediately neighboring properties.
Moreover, Harding et al found that the effect lingered for up to two years after the REO
sale. Although they found that the data supported the federal intervention in the housing
market, they noted that “a million additional foreclosures would significantly affect three
to five million homes not the forty million that has been estimated using earlier estimates
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of contagion effects” (Harding et al, p. 178). However, Harding et al limited their
analysis to the impact on the market value of neighboring properties and not the
comprehensive community effects of foreclosure.
Vacant properties alter neighborhoods in other ways (Immergluck, 2011;
Kingsley et al, 2009). These include crime, a reduced tax base, educational performance,
demographic change, the destruction of neighborhood social networks, and declining
incomes (Kingsley et al, 2009; Lauria, 1998; Immergluck, 2009a). In contrast to property
values, these effects are difficult to measure and are arguably less amenable to policy
intervention. Some of the literature, particularly that written by planners, reflects a
normative view that the chief rationale for a policy of neighborhood stabilization is to
achieve social justice and reform the market based allocation of housing resources. These
writers focus on the contagion effects that are more difficult to quantify. The
contributions of economists, on the other hand, displays a normative preference for
concrete measurable such as home values, unemployment numbers, sales volumes and
new housing starts.
Crime Crime is one of the most compelling and measurable non-financial
impacts of foreclosure. In Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, crime analyst Michael
Bess found that neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates experienced increases in
violent crime three times greater than other neighborhoods (2008). In Chicago, Smith and
Immergluck found a positive correlation between the foreclosure rate and the crime rate
(2006). Specifically, they found that a 1% increase in the foreclosure rate corresponds to
more than 2.3% increase in violent crime (2006, p. 862). Naturally, spikes in foreclosure
also lead to increased neighborhood turnover (Kingsley et al, 2009). An increase in
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vacant homes and a sense of impermanence may create an atmosphere of criminality and
threaten neighborhood order (Kingsley et al, 2009). Other research confirms that there is
a clear relationship between foreclosure and violent crime (Martin, 2010).
Education & Families Foreclosure affects education. According to Anne Martin
of the University of California, Berkely, “children [whose families experience
foreclosure, have] difficulties concentrating in school, affecting classroom dynamics in
their new schools” (Martin, 2010, p. 7). In this way, the effects of foreclosure move from
one neighborhood to another. In addition, Martin found that in California, state licensed
home based childcare providers were going out of business because their households
faced foreclosure (2010, p. 13). Reduced opportunities for affordable childcare in a
community negatively impacts families who may not themselves face foreclosure.
Diminished Tax Base Falling home values result in a diminished property tax
base, as well as abandonment and slow payment by banks who take possession of
foreclosed properties. Local governments depend on property taxes to fund essential
services like trash collection and police protection (Immergluck & Smith, 2006).
Consequently, declining property tax revenue leads to a reduction of services that affects
all households in a jurisdiction (Wassmer, 2010). Foreclosures also cause local
governments to spend more (Kingsley et al, 2009). Many communities have entered a
vicious cycle of decline in which falling home values force a reduction of services that in
turn leads to further reductions in value. Ultimately, institutions and investors decide to
wait out the market and hold the vacant property in their portfolio indefinitely with
minimal maintenance, or else abandon the property all together. Unable to police the
neighborhood, remove trash, or enforce building and safety codes, local governments
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repeat the pattern of abandonment. Consequently, homeowners who are only marginally
able to pay their mortgages become discouraged and default. In this way, foreclosures
reproduce themselves.
Societal Cost The total cost of a single foreclosure is staggering. In a study
funded by the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, William Apgar and Mark Duda
of the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, found that each foreclosure costs local
government up to $19,229 (2005). Based on these figures Kingsley, Smith, and Price
calculated an average societal cost of $79,443 for every foreclosure (2009). In addition to
the cost to local government, this figure includes the loss to the homeowner, the legal and
administrative costs to the bank, and the costs to adjacent homeowners (Kingsley et al,
2009).
The Kingsley et al assessment may actually underestimate the per foreclosure
cost. They rely on Smith and Immergluck’s 2006 determination that the contagion effect
amounts to 0.9% depreciation in immediately neighboring home values. In their analysis,
Smith and Immergluck employ data from a relatively healthy housing market, Chicago in
the late 1990s. More recent research shows a far greater effect on property values,
especially in severely impacted markets. Wassmer found that between January 2008 and
June 2009 non-distressed homes in Sacramento suffered a 31.9% loss in value because of
nearby distressed home sales (2010). Others have found much less astounding contagion
effects, rarely exceeding 10% (Lee, 2008; Schuetz et al, 2008). Nonetheless, their
findings confirm that the current contagion effect is larger than Smith and Immergluck
observed in Chicago in the 1990s.
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Martin describes the foreclosure crisis as a social catastrophe (2010). She
compares it to a mass displacement and a graphic illustration of social inequality.
According to Martin, the crisis has an impact on communities comparable to a natural
disaster and the public policy response should reflect the severity of the situation (2010,
p. 13).
Policy Responses
The federal government has deployed three forms of intervention to respond to
the foreclosure crisis (Wassmer, 2010, p. 25). The interventions’ policy goals are: 1)
reduce the likelihood of further defaults and forfeitures ex ante; 2) reform the markets for
housing and housing finance to prevent a reiteration of the crisis; and 3) intercede ex post
to ease the effects of foreclosures that have already occurred (Immergluck, 2008;
Kingsley et al, 2009). This final goal – alleviating the effects of foreclosure after the
forfeiture has occurred – has two prongs: a) assistance to households directly affected by
foreclosure; and b) mitigating the neighborhood and community effects of foreclosure
and abandonment.
Between 2008 and 2009, the federal government enacted a far-reaching package
of new programs and reforms to address each goal. In response to the first goal –
stemming the flood of defaults – the government created the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP). Market reform – the second goal – is underway as part
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, specifically title
fourteen of the law, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2010).
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To address the impacts on households directly impacted by the crisis, congress
enacted several new laws. First, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act allows
homeowners who have had substantial mortgage debt forgiven after a foreclosure, shortsale, or deed-in-lieu transaction, to avoid paying income tax on the forgiven debt
(Internal Revenue Service, 2011). Second, congress enacted the Protecting Tenants at
Foreclosure Act of 2009, which supersedes state laws and modifies federal law to require
successors-in-interest (e.g. foreclosing banks and investors) to honor the terms of an
existing lease agreement until the expiration of its term (Federal Reserve Bank, 2009).
To mitigate the effects of foreclosure on communities, Congress created, and then
expanded, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (Turner, 2010).
The NSPs
The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) is designed to mitigate the
negative externalities of foreclose. There are actually three NSPs. Congress enacted the
first, referred to as NSP1, as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) in
July 2008 (Immergluck, 2009b; Carr & Mulcahy, 2010). The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) disbursed the funds through Community Development Block
Grants (CDBG). The Department of Housing and Urban Development used a formula to
award grants to states and local governments ensuring that every state received some part
of the funding.
The federal government authorized the second program, NSP2, as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in early 2009 (Carr & Mulcahy,
2010; Immergluck, 2009b). The ARRA is often referred to as ‘The Stimulus’ in popular
discourse. Unlike NSP1, HUD awards NSP2 on a competitive basis. In addition, non-
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profits and associations of non-profits became eligible for direct funding under NSP2
(Immergluck, 2009b). Previously such entities could only participate as contractors for
local governments. This provision directed funds to organizations experienced in the
provision of low-income housing. Grantees can only use the funds in tracts especially
hard hit by the foreclosure crisis (Deng & Freeman, 2011).
Congress allocated an additional $1 billion to neighborhood stabilization as part
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer protection Act of 2010 (US
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). This third wave of funding is
referred to as NSP3. The third iteration of NSP automatically increased every state grant
below $5 million to that amount. In addition, it increased the minimum grant to $1
million.
Congress made clear its intent that the funds be narrowly targeted to the
neighborhoods with the greatest need. Many feared that if the money was spread thinly
across many communities it would have little effect. To award the funds, HUD used a
predictive formula to identify census tracts of greatest need. The formula used
unemployment change, the rate of highly leveraged loans (with different weights based
on the frequency of high cost terms), vacancy rates, and the fall of home values in the
local real estate market (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). The
unemployment information must come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS);
vacancy rates come from the United States Postal Service (USPS); the loan information is
derived from the Federal Reserve Board’s catalog of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) data; the information on property valuation is based on Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) information about metro area housing markets (US Department
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of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). Funds were then allocated to the highest
need jurisdictions with the most properties “at risk of becoming Real Estate Owned”
based on the location’s share of the state’s foreclosure starts. All these factors are
weighted and indexed to a 0-20 score. A score of 20 indicates a neighborhood severely
affected by foreclosure. Every neighborhood examined here has a score of 18-20.
Policy Deployment
The goal of the NSP is mitigation of the neighborhood effects of foreclosure
through rapid deployment of federal funds to local government. Enactment of the NSPs
clearly signals a change in course from the ideological attachment to laissez-faire
economic policy over the past two decades. Margery Austin Turner, resident scholar and
Vice President for Research at the Urban Institute, echoes the sentiments of many
planning scholars when she writes that the passage of NSP2 reflects the Obama
Administration’s renewed focus on urban policy, as well as a “commitment to evidence
based policy making” (Turner, 2010, p. 34).
In addition to focusing the federal government on community affairs, the NSP
also acknowledges the hometown expertise of local governments and offers a great deal
of flexibility in deployment. Grantees can use the funds to demolish properties, land bank
properties, purchase homes for community land trusts, directly purchase and manage real
estate, or assist investors and homebuyers to purchase properties. Policy implementation
has been uneven, with some jurisdictions rapidly deploying the funds, others
encountering procedural roadblocks, and still others simply failing to act (Strom, 2010).
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Alternative Policy Proposals In his book Sunburnt Cities, Justin Hollander
explains how the collapse of the real estate bubble affected the Sunbelt. Hollander
compared Sunbelt cities in crisis with Rustbelt cities that experienced de-industrialization
in previous decades. He compiled the planning techniques used to respond to the decline
to see which worked and which did not. Most importantly, Hollander formulated a
predictive model of the physical effects of population decline.
Hollander found that vacancy and abandonment occurs in a discernible pattern.
Ultimately, he suggests that sprawling low-density communities embrace what he calls
“shrinkage” and decline gracefully. Essentially, Hollander proposes that local
governments use a combination of direct and indirect interventions to decrease densities
in peripheral neighborhoods. The technique outlined in Sunburnt Cities is to purchase and
demolish vacant homes then offer the lots for sale to adjacent property owners at low or
no cost provided they agree to a Land Use Restriction Agreement (LURA) that prohibits
the construction of new improvements or subdivision of the property. Meanwhile,
Hollander suggests that planners incentivize development in the urban center and use the
opportunity of the foreclosure crisis to channel private enterprise into a more sustainable
pattern of development. Neighborhood Stabilization Program guidelines allow grantees to
use up to 10% of their NSP funding for demolition. Therefore, it is possible that
communities could choose to adopt this two pronged strategy by demolishing the vacant
homes in peripheral neighborhoods and concentrate other funds for renovation and
acquisition in the central city.
Sunburnt Cities provides concrete examples of the techniques planners can use to
respond to the foreclosure crisis. Although the book focuses on communities
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experiencing population decline, which is not occurring evenly throughout Florida, it
offers insight into how any community can respond to crisis. Hollander also shows that
the negative impacts of foreclosure are predictable and correlate to a number of known
variables. Neighborhood stabilization funds are allocated using a similar formula and
Hollander’s explanation provides insight into the why and how of the formula’s
predicative capability.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework
This chapter outlines a theoretical framework to analyze the effective
implementation of a specific federal housing policy, the NSP. I begin by introducing the
policy in question, and summarize the challenges that such an analysis presents. Then, I
proceeds in four sections. The first section scrutinizes rational planning and its
applicability to housing policy implementation. The second section examines
incrementalism, an alternative procedural planning theory. The third section refines the
rationalist-incrementalist dialectic by exploring mixed-scanning, a third approach that
proposes to mediate between rationalism and incrementalism. The final section concludes
with the summary of a theoretical model with which to analyze the federal program. The
final section also includes a discussion of the specific challenges to systematic study of
federal housing policy, tailoring the framework to the specific characteristics of NSP 1,
and the cultural and political idiosyncrasies of the communities studied.
The Root Synoptic planning – or the Rational Planning Model (RPM) – was the first
fully articulated procedural planning theory (Hudson, 1979). The RPM is planning in the
common meaning of the word (Banfield, 1959, p. 361). The model asks where the actor
in any given situation wants to go and how she intends to get there. As an evaluative tool,
the RPM asks whether the actor arrived at the desired end, or at least whether she is
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closer than when she began. Charles Lindblom, in a critical analysis of the RPM,
describes rational decision making as a “root,” referring to its linearity (Lindblom, 1959,
80). Synoptic planning is grounded in the modern Western tradition of rational decisionmaking and relies upon binary propositions of good and not good. Barclay Hudson
attributes the analytical power of the RPM to its simplicity and adaptability to a broad
range of problems (Hudson, 1979, p. 389).
Edward C. Banfield was one of the great expositors of synoptic planning. In a 1959
article entitled “Ends and Means in Planning” Banfield outlined the general framework of
the RPM and described its limitations. The article is an excellent point of departure for
any discussion of procedural planning models.
The critics of synoptic planning overstate its deficiencies. Banfield acknowledges that
“no choice can ever be perfectly rational” (1959, p. 362). Nonetheless, he contends that
the inability of real human beings to consider every possible consequence and draft a
fully comprehensive plan to attain a desired end, does not negate the utility of rational
decision-making. Given this reality, Banfield defines a rational decision as “one in which
alternatives and consequences are considered as fully as the decision maker, given the
time and other resources available to him, can afford to consider them” (1959, p. 362).
Therefore, the exclusive criteria for evaluating a means employed to attain any given
policy goal are 1) whether the actors involved considered all the alternative and
consequences they were able to; and 2) whether the means ultimately achieve the desired
end.
From Banfield’s point of view, “it is by the process of rational choice that the best
adaptation of means to ends is likely to be achieved;” and it is through the calculating
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process of rational choice that they are to be evaluated (1959, p. 361). With
characteristically pre-1960 confidence, he posits, “good planning” is “likely to attain the
ends or maximize the chances of their attainment” (Banfield, 1959, p. 361). Presumably,
the rational binary reduces any plan that does not achieve the desired end to not good.
The persuasive power of Banfield’s argument is its candid recognition of the lack of
planning in public policy. Banfield makes the counterintuitive observation that a lack of
planning characterized the United States even at the height of its industrial and
geopolitical power. Banfield bemoans the narrowness and shortsightedness of private
sector planning and the absence of planning altogether in the public sector. The little
planning that was evident in public projects was anything but rational, according to
Banfield (1959, p. 363). Instead, it reflected various conflicting means and ends
haphazardly formulated in the disjointed power centers of the American political process.
The saga of the Chicago Public Housing Authority illustrates the point (Banfield,
1959, p. 364-366). First, a set of national goals and prescribed means directed the
Authority; then the state government exercised its own influence. Afterwards, the ethnic
politics of that balkanized city entangled the administrators tasked with implementation
of the policy. Banfield bemoans the fact that building sites were chosen not for their
amenability to the fundamental purposes for which they were built, but rather on the basis
of whether the alderman who represented the district supported its construction (1959,
365). Finally, a change in the political climate culminated in directives to address racial
segregation in Chicago. Banfield observes in frustration that “before the buildings [were]
occupied,” the Housing Authority became “an instrument for the reform of race
relations” (1959, p. 365). The Authority, with scarce resources, was tasked with the
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provision of low-income housing, slum clearance, and limiting residential segregation.
Obviously, the most effective means to accomplish one of these goals may not work for
the others (Banfield, 1959, p. 365). It may indeed work against the others. Furthermore,
resource constraints may leave the Authority unable to achieve the goals simultaneously,
even if they were complimentary. According to Banfield, the absence of rational decision
making in public planning results in a costly trip to nowhere.
The rational planning model attempts to bring cohesion and purpose to planning.
Clear definition of ends and means gives focus to a plan and an evaluative measure of the
means: do they achieve the desired ends? Furthermore, deliberate planning allows for
comprehensiveness and the consideration of unintended consequences. Banfield insists
that a lack of political realism is not a failing of rational planning, but rather an occasion
to point out opportunities for greater efficiency and effectiveness (1959, 368).

Figure 1 – NSP analysis using a synoptic framework.
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The Branch The RPM requires an unrealistic knowledge and ability to foresee the
future consequences of policy decisions. The distinction between means and ends is not
precise in real social decision-making and the comprehensiveness required for truly
rational policymaking is not possible (Etzioni, 1967, p. 386). In the same year Banfield
refined the RPM, another scholar, Charles Lindblom, proposed an alternative planning
paradigm.
In a pluralistic society, opposing factions frequently converge upon a consensus. That
consensus is in a constant incremental state of flux, changing imperceptibly day-by-day,
but unrecognizable after a century. Lindblom calls this process of consensus building
“mutual adjustment” and it is an essential element of incrementalism (1979, p. 522-523).
Mutual adjustment provides a useful paradigm for policy analysis (Lindblom, 1979, p.
524). It explains why a proposition that is mildly unpleasant to all parties is tolerable to
the whole. The details of any single policy do not represent a total win–lose situation for
any party to the debate (Lindblom, 1979). This situation leads to greater willingness to
compromise during the creation of policy and greater tolerance of its politically
unpalatable aspects during implementation.
Lindblom posits that planners and other public managers should dispense with the
pretense of comprehensiveness. The spectrum of alternative policies should instead be
limited to those that are politically feasible. Similarly, incrementalism only considers
crucial consequences within the planner’s control. The incrementalist planner, by limiting
the continuum of policy alternatives and consequences to her own range of efficacy, is
able to constantly reassess and change direction (Etzioni, 1967, p.387). In this way, the
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partisans for and against a social policy (as well as effected third-parties) go through the
continuous process of “mutual adjustment” whereby the comprehensive policy emerges –
and changes – from the long term evolution of its constituent parts (Lindblom, 1959, p.
85). In “The Science of Muddling Through,” Lindblom points to income redistribution in
the United States to illustrate the emergence of a general policy emerging through the
evolution of specific policies over time (1959, p.85). The pieces of the puzzle that are
overlooked in one part of the process become the primary focus somewhere else
(Lindblom, 1959).

Figure 2 - NSP analysis using an incrementalist framework

Mixed Methods Scanning Incrementalism leaves little room to consider
alternatives to the status quo. For this reason, Amitai Etzioni describes it as conservative
(1967, p. 385). The shortcoming of incrementalism, according to Etzioni, is its
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nearsightedness. While incrementalism speaks to the unworkability of the Rational
Planning Model in real life, it tends to throw the baby out with the bath water.
Incrementalism leaves no room for new solutions to far-reaching social problems. The
focus on immediacy is therefore limiting according to Etzioni. In his view, decision
making in small increments risks going nowhere, it is like a man walking in circles.
Lindblom offered incrementalism as an alternative to unactionable rationalistic planning.
For Etzioni, incrementalism went too far and amounted to “acting without direction”
(Etzioni, 1967, p.388). Moreover, Etzioni observes, mutual adjustment fails to account
for the reality that different groups have unequal access to power. The “underprivileged
and politically unorganized” are unable to stage a multipronged and extended effort to
shape the evolution of policy (Etzioni, 1967, p.387).
Etzioni posits that a third alternative is possible, mixed scanning. Etzioni joins in
Lindblom’s rejection of the modernist project – the paradigm of methodical rationality
within which apolitical technocrats design and implement policy in linear fashion –
however, he stops short of Lindblom’s incrementalism. Instead, he posits that a less
flexible paradigm of decision-making and analysis is practicable. The model consists of a
two-level approach to gathering information (mixed-scanning), a semi-normative basis
for evaluation, and contextualization qualified by “morphological factors” (Etzioni,
1967, p. 389-392).
In the abstract, mixed scanning combines a non-comprehensive view of the macro
environment with a detailed view of the micro level environment. Etzioni employs the
metaphor of a weather mapping system that keeps a detailed focus on the specific service
area, but also maintains a lower resolution view of a larger area (1967, p. 389). Since
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1967, academics have elaborated on the theoretical model and practitioners have
demonstrated its utility (Etzioni, 1986, p. 8). In 1986 Etzioni revisited mixed scanning in
an aptly titled article “Mixed Scanning Revisited.” Again, Etzioni provides instances of
mixed scanning. Two notable examples include a reference to U.S. Cold War foreign
policy, and a description of an early computerized geographic information system called
Decision Information Discipline System (DIDS). The macro level decision to contain the
expansion of Soviet influence immediately after World War II became the overriding
principle that guided micro level incremental decisions for several decades. Without
reference to the larger more comprehensive decision (containment) the incremental
decisions (preemptive intervention in unaligned countries) would not make sense
(Etzioni, 1986, p. 8). In the case of the DIDs, a regional level analysis confirmed a
general trend in population growth, while a focused micro level trend revealed
aberrations correlated to incremental policy decisions (Etzioni, 1986, p. 8-9).
In the 1967 article, Etzioni articulated an evaluative framework to assess policy
implementation. First, define the primary goal of the policy (Etzioni, 1967, p. 387-390).
If multiple goals are implied, decide by rank order. In the case that there are two or more
major policy goals (Etzioni uses the example of a teaching hospital with equal mission to
teach, research, and treat patients), the analyst will consider the extent to which the policy
achieves each goal (Etzioni, 1967, p. 390). In such cases the analyst may additionally rely
upon informal ranking processes (Etzioni suggests, for instance, that professors may
value research over teaching). Decide whether the implementation is realizing the goal(s).
If the current implementation meets this evaluative benchmark, the policy is good
(Etzioni, 1967, p. 390). All the while, the analyst should note the policy’s effect on

31

secondary goals. This process of “zooming out” to see whether the implementation is
leading in the general direction of the policy goal, gives purpose to incremental streetlevel decisions.
It is easy to see how such an evaluative framework mediates between rationalism
and incrementalism. The framework provides a degree of comprehensiveness and
linearity, but only after the goals have been defined by a consensus grounded in political
reality. The evaluative criteria is not whether a grand plan has been achieved, but whether
the incremental steps of planners and other actors comport with a policy’s stated goal. In
effect, it gives existential meaning to the work of the incrementalist planner.
The dichotomy implies a deeper philosophical question about democratic
legitimacy: whether planners and public managers should row or steer the “ship of the
state” (Holzer, 2004, p.53). On the part of Lindblom and his intellectual heirs, it is also a
matter of efficacy couched in the straightforward observation that in a liberal-state,
private-sector managers have much greater control over the inputs of production than
planners (Holzer, 2004, p. 53). Ironically, the synoptic-rationalist disregards this reality in
pursuit of comprehensiveness. The disconnect results in plans that stand as aspirational
civic statements never to be actualized (Long, 1959).
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Figure 3 - NSP analysis using mixed-scanning techniques. The primary focus is on micro level implementation,
the macro level should be obscured, however, for formatting purposes it is not possible to express that here.

Application to Federal Housing Policy Federal policy is inconsistent. In
“Swimming against the Tide” Alice O’Connor provides an exhaustive history of federal
policy in poor communities (1999). Nonetheless, O’Connor’s observations and analysis
of community level federal policy interventions can be generalized to communities that
are not necessarily poor. Writing in the late 1990s, O’Connor saw the tide of federal
policy as consistently receding from poor communities, especially racially defined urban
neighborhoods. From O’Connor’s point of view, the high tide of federal policy was
passage of the Great Society programs during the Johnson administration. Even during
the 1960’s however, policy goals were obfuscated in the implementation process
(O’Connor, 1999). Changes in the national political climate reshaped the goals of federal
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programs even as they were implemented. As the tide turned and fiscal conservatism
drove federal policy, funding was in a constant state of flux leaving administrators and
beneficiaries in a state of perpetual uncertainty. The result is that it is nearly impossible to
analyze the effectiveness or best practices of a single poverty intervention, because its
purpose and procedures, even its very existence, is likely to change.
The tide has shifted again. Since 2008, the federal government has taken a role in
regulating markets and investing in communities that would have seemed impossible just
a few years ago. The NSP is a product of this process. Each of the three versions of the
program was created as part of a larger legislative package. Each program was enacted to
achieve different ends and permitted local governments to use different means.
The overall goals of federal policy have shifted wildly since NSP1 was enacted in
2008. Unless there is a fourth round of NSP funding, the NSP is a one-off event that does
not fit into any cohesive community development policy. Consequently, examining the
effectiveness of NSP grantees is complicated by the differing goals and means of each
NSP, as well as the lack of a single overriding national goal.
Neighborhood Stabilization Analysis of the NSP should proceed using mixedscanning. The advantage of mixed-scanning is that it takes on the realism and flexibility
of incrementalism without abandoning the rational grounding of the rational planning
model. In this way, the research can focus on street level adjustments in ends and means
within local community development agencies. This level of analysis matches the high
resolution local weather satellite in Etzioni’s illustration. The community level
implementation of the NSP will uncover the process of “muddling through” local social
and political realities.
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At the same time, researcher can retain some sense of the program’s technical
purpose: to mitigate the contagion effect of foreclosure and stop neighborhood
deterioration. This broader level of analysis is akin to the low-resolution wide-view lens.
However these concepts are operationalized, the two-level approach allows for a
comprehensive, yet focused inquiry. It also allows for a falsifiable conclusion that the
program has or has not achieved a normative goal.
The stated goal of NSP is to stabilize “communities that have suffered from
foreclosures and abandonment [through] the purchase and redevelopment of foreclosed
and abandoned homes and residential properties” (U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 2010). Furthermore, congress indicated that 25% of every grant
should benefit households earning less than 50% of Area Median Income (AMI) and that
all funds should benefit households earning less than 120% of AMI. Local administrative
costs should not exceed 10% of the grant amount. Congress directed HUD to allocate the
funds according to particular criteria, but left wide latitude for counties and
municipalities to determine the particular means of fulfilling the mandate (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2008).
Within the mixed scanning framework, the success of NSP implementation will
be gauged by how well the incremental responses to real-world social and political
conditions accomplish the stated national goal. Accomplishing the goal is not a matter of
hard metrics, like the number of families housed or vacant properties demolished.
Instead, success is a question of how well the outcome resembles the image of the
overriding principle of “neighborhood stabilization” situated in the particular context of a
specific neighborhood. For instance, in one community the demolition of vacant housing
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and reduction of density may result in successful stabilization. In another community the
construction of new multi-family housing and an increase of density may be the measure
of success. In yet another neighborhood simply performing long-deferred maintenance
and reselling a few homes at market value will accomplish stabilization. The next chapter
examines the incremental tools used by NSP grantees throughout the state of Florida to
achieve the congressional mandate to stabilize distressed neighborhoods. The chapters
that follow afterwards examine the outcomes of three specific jurisdictions.
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Chapter 4: Implementation of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program in Florida
Florida is a primary recipient of NSP funds. This is largely attributable to the fact
that the foreclosure crisis severely affected the state. As a result, federal policies designed
to address neighborhood level problems of foreclosure have disproportionately benefited
Florida. The state accounts for 49 of the 307 local governments nationwide awarded NSP
1 funds, and 13.81% of all funds expended by the end of the third quarter of 2011 (U.S.
Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2011). As a result, Florida is a great
place to examine NSP implementation.
Program Constraints The Department of Housing and Urban Development
administers the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 2010b). Grantees are given wide latitude to devise innovative ways to
spend the money. Nonetheless, there are several key limitations. For example, no grantee
can spend more than 10% of its NSP funds on program administration (Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2010). Additionally, demolition cannot exceed 10% of
the budget (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). Although blight
clearance is not an approved use of NSP funds unless it furthers the goal of mitigating the
effect of foreclosure, any properties to be demolished must be blighted. Consequently,
counties and municipalities must give a definition of the term blight when applying for an
NSP grant. This prevents the use of NSP funds to supplement local slum and blight
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removal activities unrelated to foreclosure. It also prevent the destruction of useable
housing stock.
Grantees must also comply with the vicinity hiring requirement in place for all
CDBG funds (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2011). This condition,
“to the maximum extent feasible, provide for the hiring of employees who reside in the
vicinity,” is the primary economic development tool of the NSP (Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 2011). Grantees must also make reasonable provision for
environmentally friendly and energy efficient building practices (Department of Housing
and Urban Development, 2010). In addition, NSP recipients must make an effort to
gather citizen input when drafting their action plans. The core allocation requirement is
that benefits of the program must flow to a particular range of income classes.
The provision of low-income housing is one of the national objectives of the NSP.
Every grantee must set aside 25% of its total funding for families at or below 50% of the
median household income (AMI) (Kirwin Institute , 2010). Many Florida grantees are
eager to use existing homebuyer assistance programs to implement NSP. Consequently,
the focus is often on homeownership rather than rental properties. The result is that most
of the action plans submitted by Florida counties and cities – and approved by HUD –
include plans to expand homeownership for families earning less than 50% of AMI. The
25% requirement produces a very low income-ceiling. For example, a one person
household in Sarasota County can earn no more than $21,780. Sarasota County has
developed a novel solution to this challenge by drastically reducing the cost of housing
(see discussion of affordability below). Most grantees, however, simply state their
intention to provide down-payment assistance and sell renovated homes to households
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below the low-income ceiling. The families must qualify for a market rate purchase
money loan. The remaining 65% of funds can be used for low, moderate, and middle
income households: families who earn less than 120% of AMI.
Allowable Uses Allowable expenses under NSP fall into eight broad categories;
1) acquisition, 2) clearance, 3) homeownership, 4) land banking, 5) public facilities &
economic development, 6) residential new construction, 7) residential rehab, and 8)
administrative costs. Funds must be obligated within 18 months of action plan approval
by HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). All of NSP1
funds must be spent within four years (Kirwin Institute , 2010; U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 2010). As a result, the majority of NSP 1 programs
funds awarded to Florida grantees will be spent by the end of 2013. In reality, most have
already been expended as of February 2012 or continued through subsequent NSP2 and
NSP3 grants.
Municipalities may choose to acquire properties and place them in a land bank for
up to ten years while they maintain the property and clear it of blight conditions
(Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010b). Nonetheless, any property
acquired with NSP funds and placed in a land bank must ultimately be used for an NSP
eligible purpose. As mentioned before, clearance cannot exceed 10% of an NSP grant
(many Rustbelt cities have used the funds to supplement larger efforts to reduce density
in residential neighborhoods). Throughout the nation – as shown in the chart below –
residential rehab is the most popular use of NSP funds.
Affordability Affordability is one of the goals of the neighborhood stabilization
program. Communities in Florida have adopted a variety of techniques to ensure that low
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to middle-income households can continue to benefit from the government’s investment
in housing for years to come. One such tool is the Land Use Restriction Agreement
(LURA). Another is the Community Land Trust (CLT). Perhaps the most common is the
“soft mortgage.” Another popular tool is the Shared Appreciation Mortgage (SAM).
A LURA is a contractual restriction on the use of a particular piece of real
property. A few Florida NSP grantees are using LURAs to ensure the long-term
affordability of rental housing. In this way a municipality can purchase and rehabilitate
multi-family housing and sell it to a private entity. The LURA imposes income
qualifications on the new landlord’s tenants and a formula for determining a fair rent. In
some cases, LURAs are also being used to ensure that a homebuyer remains an owner
occupant for several years, thereby stabilizing the neighborhood (Town of Davie Housing
and Community Development, 2010).
Community Land Trusts are a means of keeping property perpetually affordable.
A land trust – also known as a Community Housing trust (CHT) – resembles a housing
cooperative corporation (Co-op) in that ownership of land resides in an independent
entity, generally a non-profit corporation. The land trust continues to own the land, and
sells the structures that sit upon it to homebuyers, with a ‘perpetual’ lease. Conceptually,
this keeps the property affordable, as the homebuyer does not own the underlying land. In
the case of single-family detached housing, the land can represent 30% or more of the
sale price. Limiting the market purchase price to only the improvements drastically
reduces the cost of purchasing a home.
Community Land Trusts with provisions that ensure continued affordability are
somewhat more complicated. Generally, these take the form of deed restrictions. The
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homebuyers must be of low to moderate income, usually defined by reference to AMI.
Usually the maximum income falls somewhere between 80% and 120% of AMI. In
addition, the CLT limits the amount of positive equity a homeowner can realize from the
property. Sometimes this is an outright cap of resale price. Other times the CLT requires
any amount above a predetermined amount to be shared with the CLT to expand and
support its efforts.
The Sarasota Community Housing Trust (SCHT) predates NSP. However,
funding from NSP is transforming the entity. The SCHT is quite flexible and allows the
trust to sell the land after twenty years (Sarasota Office of Housing and Community
Development, 2011). Conceptually this prevents a short-term solution to affordability
from causing long-term problems of alienability. It also focuses its efforts on households
earning less than 100% of AMI. A few properties are restricted to households earning
less than 80% of AMI. Properties enter the trust as qualified families elect to use NSP
funds to purchase a distressed home and offer the underlying land to the SCHT. The
Sarasota Office of Housing and Community Development then subsidizes the purchase
using NSP funds. If the trust later sells the property back into the unrestricted market, the
Trust can elect to either a) repay the subsidy with interest; or b) use the proceeds to
purchase additional affordable housing (Sarasota Office of Housing and Community
Development, 2011).
A soft second mortgage is a blanket term. Generally, it refers to a loan with
delayed repayment and minimal interest (Benjamin, Rubin, & Zielenbach, 2004). Soft
seconds are usually part of down payment assistance programs for first time homebuyers
(Benjamin, Rubin, & Zielenbach, 2004). The loans often cover not only the down
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payment, but also closing costs allowing households of limited means to become
homeowners. Many Florida NSP grantees are ensuring affordability through soft second
mortgages. The loans are arranged through the HOME down payment assistance
program. Low-income homebuyers must attend a HUD approved class covering topics
such as homeownership, credit worthiness, and real estate transactions. They must also
qualify for a conventional mortgage. The city or county will then sell them a home
acquired and renovated using NSP funds. In many cases the buyer will never have to
make payments on the second mortgage. If they do, repayment is structured to be
affordable.
A SAM is a mortgage-secured purchase money loan structured more like an
equity investment than a debt instrument (Caplin et al, 2008). The homebuyer exchanges
the mortgage for use of public (or publicly guaranteed) money. The mortgagee is either
the municipality or a financial institution that works closely with local housing officials.
The borrower must repay the principle and a portion of the appreciation on the property
upon sale or discharge of the primary mortgage (Caplin, 2007). The appreciation is based
upon the amount of the original purchase price subsidized by local government. The
proceeds are used to discount the purchase price to the next buyer, thus ensuring longterm affordability even if the home is priced in an inflating real estate market (Caplin et
al, 2008).
The affordability requirement creates a short-term technical and ethical challenge,
as well as a long term opportunity to provide affordable housing. There is a tension
between the competing programmatic goals of price stabilization in middle-income
neighborhoods on the one hand, and provision of housing options for low-income
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households on the other hand. Grantees are faced with a choice of working against the
overall imperative of the NSP – containing the contagion effects of foreclosure – or
confirming price declines by placing units in the low-income market. As mentioned
above, Sarasota County has chosen to do this by removing land-value from market
valuation through a community land trust. This provides a permanent supply of lowincome housing but undermines the character of the neighborhood. Alternatively,
grantees can take the path of least resistance and further the spatial concentration of
poverty by targeting all low-income housing funds to existing low-income
neighborhoods. Marion County, discussed in Chapter Seven, has chosen this practice.
The county purchased and renovated rental properties in West Ocala, a neighborhood
already defined by concentrated poverty. The housing is only available to households
earning less than 50% of AMI. The resale and rental of properties acquired through NSP
generates income for local governments. Grantees may use program income to continue
funding activities that serve the housing needs of households earning less than 50% of
AMI. In this way communities that are NSP grantees benefit from a legacy funding
mechanism.
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Chapter 5: Methods
This research employs mixed quantitative and qualitative methods. Conceptually
the benefit of this approach is that it enjoys the flexibility and context of descriptive data
and personal observation couched in a firm quantitative metric. Unfortunately, as will be
shown, the results of the quantitative analysis imply that the contagion effect upon which
this research is premised may not be as predictable or universal as the literature suggests.
At the very least the neighborhoods examined here may not be representative of the
general trend throughout Florida and the United States.
This chapter broadly outlines the research design. The research question and the
working hypothesis are stated below. In the course of research operationalizing
foreclosure proved to be a more difficult task than expected. This chapter includes a brief
discussion of two measures researchers can use to count foreclosure in Florida. It is a
challenging issue and draws into question the statements of researchers, public officials,
and journalists claiming that a certain number or rate of foreclosures exists within any
given geography. Moreover, any statement that foreclosure correlates with any other
phenomenon is a dubious claim without a succinct statement of what exactly the word
foreclosure means.
After the section defining foreclosure, this chapter introduces the study area.
There are a total of ten neighborhoods examined here. The neighborhoods are located in
three different counties each representative of a different region of the state. Six of these
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neighborhoods are treated in the quantitative analysis; all of them are included in the
qualitative study. Finally, the data sources are identified. The methods with which the
data were treated are briefly introduced. The quantitative methods used in this research
are most easily discussed with real examples to illustrate the relationship between
appraised values of properties in close proximity to one another. As a result, in depth
discussion of the quantitative methodology is found in Chapter Six.
Research Question Has the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)
effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure in select Florida census
tracts as measured by home values and other metrics of neighborhood wellbeing?
Working Hypothesis (1) The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)
has effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure as measured by home
values. (2) Because the NSP involves government intervention as a market
participant, there will be little or no discernible effect of neighborhood wellbeing
as measured by personal observation and public records.
Defining Foreclosure A persistent challenge for researchers has been to
define and identify distressed properties. In Florida, when a mortgagee begins to
foreclose upon its lien as a result of non-payment by the mortgagor, a lis pendens
is recorded with the clerk of court to put interested parties on notice that there is
pending legal action associated with the property. Recording the lis pendens
indicates that the property has entered the foreclosure process. However, the mere
filing of a lis pendens does not tell the whole story.
Very often the foreclosure process is stalled or avoided. This can happen
for a number of reasons, the parties can reach an agreement to modify the

45

mortgage, the case be dismissed for procedural reasons; the property owner can
sell the property; the parties can agree to a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure; or the
plaintiff-mortgagee can allow the mortgagor to pay its arrearage and resume
payment on the associated note, or simply abandon its claim altogether.
Consequently, researchers examining the impacts of foreclosure cannot simply
rely on lis pendens to identify foreclosed homes.
At the end of a foreclosure process, after a judgment is entered and the
debtor’s right to redemption has expired, a court ordered sale of the property will
take place. The foreclosing lien holder can bid up to the amount that it is owed
and take possession of the property; or, if another party bids a greater amount the
purchaser takes possession and the proceeds are applied to satisfy the lien-holder.
In either scenario, title is conveyed by a certificate of title which is duly recorded
by the clerk of court. Therefore, a search of public records for certificates of title
associated with foreclosure actions will indicate properties that actually went all
the way through the foreclosure process.
Researchers are faced with a decision point, whether to focus on
foreclosed homes, or distressed homes. The mere filing of a lis pendens indicates
default on a loan and financial trouble. Even in situations where there is a sale,
loan modification, or deed-in-lieu that prevents forcible dispossession of the
owners, there may be abandonment or lack of upkeep that impacts the
neighborhood and exacerbates property value declines. On the other hand, in
spite of the historic high in foreclosure, actual forced sales remain rare, the
neighborhood impacts on home values and the implications for the larger
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economy are much more severe when parties complete the foreclosure process
and a lien-holder must take possession, manage, and market a property in order to
recover its investment. Real Estate Owned (REO) consistently sells for less than
non-REO property, primarily because banks lack the expertise and local
knowledge to market property and prefer liquid funds to holding a portfolio of
real property (Pennington-Cross, 2006, p. 211-212). In the current market, sales
by owners before the foreclosure process is complete are often “short-sales,” that
is a sale approved by the lien-holder for less than is owed. Research indicates that
lien holders lose 50% of their investment from REO, compared to as little as 34%
from short-sales (Pennington-Cross, 2010).
In either event, the properties will be used as comparables to appraise
future sale prices of similar nearby properties. The measurable consequences for
neighborhoods where multiple foreclosures have occurred are much greater than
neighborhoods that merely have many distressed properties.
The formula for allocating NSP dollars relies on lis pendens and technical
defaults. Therefore, I follow that pattern of focusing on distressed rather than
foreclosed properties. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a neighborhood
could have had many distressed properties in mid-2009 that never actually
completed the foreclosure process. This is especially true in areas affected by the
loss of employment in the building trades and automatic adjustments in variablerate-mortgages. In these areas the market may self-correct without undermining
neighborhood integrity, though it may be painful for individual households. In
other neighborhoods, especially those defined by historic racial exclusion (e.g.
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West Ocala) or persistent disinvestment and class stratification (e.g. Central
Rockledge) the recent financial crisis can have devastating neighborhood effects.
Therefore, in the qualitative section of this research I consider concentrations of
homes that have actually gone through the foreclosure process.
Study Area Country Club Estates is a neighborhood in the city of
Rockledge. Brevard County used NSP funds to stabilize the neighborhood.
Central Rockledge is another neighborhood in the City of Rockledge. Brevard
County did not target the neighborhood for stabilization with NSP funds.
Rainbow Park is a failed development in rural Marion County. The
County used NSP funds to purchase properties in the development. West Ocala is
an urban neighborhood in the City of Ocala. Marion County selected the
neighborhood to receive NSP intervention. Marion Oaks is a master planned
community in unincorporated Marion County. The community is located south of
Ocala near the Sumter County border. Marion County targeted a large portion of
its NSP grant to Marion Oaks. Silver Springs Shores is a housing development in
eastern Marion County near the Ocala National Forest. The neighborhood also
received a large share of the County’s NSP funds. Turning Point is the largest
housing development in the census tracts east and north of Marion Oaks. The area
did not receive NSP funds.
Naples Park is a neighborhood in Collier County north of Naples.
Although the neighborhood has experienced a high rate of foreclosure, Collier
County did not spend NSP funds in the community. Golden Gate City is a
neighborhood in unincorporated Collier County. It is east of Naples. The
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neighborhood received substantial investment through the NSP. Golden Gate
Estates is north and east of Golden Gate City. It too received significant
investment through the Collier County NSP.

Table 1- Neighborhoods in Quantitative & Qualitative Sections

Neighborhoods Discussed in Quantitative & Qualitative Sections
Jurisdiction

NSP Neighborhood

Tract

Non-NSP

Tract

Marion

Marion Oak

0010.02

Turning Point

0009.01

Collier

Golden Gate Estates

0112.02

Naples Park

0101.04

Brevard-Rockledge

Country Club Estates

0629

Central Rockledge

0631.01

Table 2 -Neighborhoods only in Qualitative Section

Neighborhoods Discussed only in Qualitative Section
Jurisdiction

NSP Neighborhood

Census Tract

Marion

West Ocala

0017, 0018

Rainbow Park

0026.01

Silver Springs

0012.04

Shores
Collier

Golden Gate City

0104.09,
0104.11
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Figure 4 - Country Club Estates

Figure 5 - Central Rockledge
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Figure 6 - West Ocala

Figure 7 - Rainbow Park

51

Figure 8 - Marion Oaks

Figure 9 - Naples Park
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Figure 10 - Golden Gate City

Figure 11 - Golden Gate Estates
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Figure 12 - Silver Springs Shores

Methodology and Procedure
Quantitative Sources of Data
Property Appraiser Data In the course of this research I relied heavily on the
online databases maintained by the elected property appraisers of Brevard, Collier, and
Marion counties. In particular, I used these sources for information about assessed
property values, ownership information, the years that improvements were built, and
parcel identification numbers. Some of the property appraisers in Florida maintain very
user-friendly online databases with GIS mapping, assessments from multiple years, and
links to Tax Collector TRIM notices, code enforcement documents, building sketches,
and clerk of court conveyance documents. Some even allow the user to identify the same
information for nearby parcels with a single mouse-click. Unfortunately, none of the
counties in the study areas are this user-friendly. Gathering information about the parcels
required consultation of other public records.
54

Tax Collector In addition to property appraiser data, I consulted the databases
maintained by the elected tax collectors for each of the three jurisdictions. Tax collector
data was particularly useful for determining past appraisal values for properties in
Rockledge.
Clerk of Court The clerk of court for each of the 67 counties in Florida maintains
a public record of documents relating to interests in real property. I consulted these
records to identify distressed properties. As mentioned below, I also used public records
to uncover trends within neighborhoods relating to code violations.
Qualitative Data Sources
Professional Literature In 2010, the Kiriwin Institute analyzed the
implementation of NSP 1 and 2 in Florida. The Institute’s efforts culminated in
‘Recovering from Crisis, A Review of Neighborhood Stabilization in Florida’s Economic
Recovery.” To date it is the only comprehensive scholarly examination of the NSP
program in Florida that focuses on technical implementation. Although the emphasis of
that work was economic stimulus and racial access to housing, its procedural framework
and methodology were a major influence on this research. Additionally, I consulted a
2006 HUD publication for practitioners entitled “Best Practices for Effecting the
Rehabilitation of Affordable Housing.” The HUD document identified important sources
and an approach to information necessary to examine housing policies.
NSP Resource Exchange The primary source of substantive information for this
research is HUD’s NSP Resource Exchange website. The site is an invaluable resource
for anyone interested in the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. It contains all of the
governing documents for all three NSP programs.
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Action Plans and Quarterly Reports In addition to general information
about the NSP, the Resource Exchange includes downloadable action plans,
amended action plans, and quarterly reports from every grantee in the country.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development provides “snapshots” and
summary reports about the program generally, and the performance of specific
grantees.
Online Mapping Application The Resource Exchange includes an
interactive mapping tool with tract scores and the component statistics that are
used in the greatest-need-formula. Additionally, there is raw data available for
download that can be manipulated using geographic information systems (GIS) or
statistical analysis software. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) also maintains hyperlinks to multimedia collections located at YouTube
and Flickr. A wealth of material related to best practices is available on the
Resource Exchange in the form of webinars, training manuals, white papers, and
scholarly articles.
Electronic Sources and Grantee Documents I also utilized information
maintained by the grantees themselves. Often, these resources included information about
internal decision making processes (e.g. promotional materials, maps, neighborhood
descriptions). This information was supplemented by real estate listings, county tax
collector databases, county property appraiser databases, and public records maintained
by county clerks of court.
Code Enforcement Collier County maintains a searchable database of code
enforcement actions accessible to the public via the internet. The database is accessible at
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the Collier County Growth Management Division – Planning and Regulation website
(Collier County, 2012). I searched the Collier County code enforcement database for
parcel IDs of distressed properties. I then searched for addresses on the same street to
determine if the presence of distressed properties created conditions that led to more
frequent citations.
The city of Rockledge does not maintain a similar database. It does, however, file
liens against properties with unpaid fines. Rockledge also takes a lien against properties
that have been abandoned. The City must secure the property and cut the grass and uses a
lien against title to ensure that the city will someday be reimbursed for the expense. Code
enforcement liens are recorded with the clerk of court and can be found through a search
of public records. I searched Brevard County public records for liens where the city was
named as a party within the relevant range of dates and a partial legal description of a
known distressed property. The results roughly approximated neighborhoods because the
properties shared section and subdivision information. Brevard County public records are
accessible at the Brevard Clerk of Court website (Brevard Clerk of Court, 2012). I used
the same technique in Marion County searching for instances when Marion County Code
Enforcement was the listed lien holder. Marion County official records are accessible at
the Marion County Clerk of Court website (Marion County Clerk of Court, 2012).
Crime Information about crime was collected from a number of sources. For
crime in Marion County I consulted the archives of the Ocala Star-Banner “police and
community briefs,” a section in the daily paper that reports recent arrests and criminal
incidents (Ocala Star-Banner, 2012). The Collier County Sherriff’s Department maintains
an interactive crime map that displays the type and location of crime along with the day
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and time a deputy arrived. In addition, the crime map indicates the reason a deputy
responded, whether there was an anonymous tip or a call for service (Collier County
Sheriff's Department, 2012). Unfortunately, neither the Rockledge Police Department,
nor the Brevard County Sheriff’s department maintains a searchable database of crime
that associates incidents with specific addresses. The only data available are annual
statistics about Rockledge as whole.
Education Information about school performance came from the Florida
Department of Education (FLDOE) 2010-2011 school accountability report. The report is
available for download in excel format at the FLDOE website (Florida Department of
Education , 2011). Additionally, information about which schools in the FLDOE report
serve each neighborhood came from the school board websites of Brevard, Collier, and
Marion.
Google Alerts Knowing that the large-scale investment of federal funds is
contentious and noteworthy, I expected local news outlets to report on the NSP resource
allocation and policy implementation. Accordingly, I used a Google alert with the
keywords “NSP,” and “Florida” from mid-August 2011 to the present. From the results, I
was able to create a small bank of local newspaper, public radio, and television news
articles related to the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. This information proved to be
an invaluable insight into local opposition to some NSP activity, corruption in the
implementation of NSP 1, and the comments of local officials to journalists that cannot
be found in official action plans and quarterly reports.
Direct Observations I personally visited each of the neighborhoods examined in
this research. During the visits I walked the neighborhood and observed the housing
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stock and the state of the neighborhood. In the NSP neighborhoods I visited homes
purchased and renovated through the program as well as neighboring properties. Upon
arriving in a neighborhood I located a home I knew to be distressed. I observed the
distressed home and its neighbors and began to walk as much of the neighborhood as
possible using the distressed properties as a starting point. Specifically, I looked for
indicators of neighborhood decline such as unkempt lawns, visible disrepair, signs of
vandalism or graffiti, vacant homes, heaps of refuse, and signs indicating that homes
were being sold at a discount (e.g. “short sale”). In addition, I looked for signs of
neighborhood vitality, such as residents socializing with each other, well maintained
properties, indications of neighborhood organization, and signs and advertisements
emphasizing the construction quality and location of available properties rather than their
bargain prices. I visited Marion County on January 6th and 7th of 2012; Collier County on
January 20th; and Rockledge on February 4th.

59

Chapter 6: The effect of NSP expenditure on home values
This Chapter begins by further elaborating on the methodology introduced in
Chapter Five. Then the observations are presented for three neighborhoods receiving NSP
funds, and three similar neighborhoods not receiving NSP funds. In each neighborhood,
distressed and non-distressed homes are identified. First, the baseline pre-crisis average
value for each home is identified. Then, the relationship between the appraised values of
the distressed properties and appraised values of the non-distressed properties is
measured using the mean ratio of difference of intrinsic value. Post crisis observations are
taken on the same property using 2011 appraisals. These data are then treated with
regression analysis using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software.
The results indicate that the limited sample is not statistically significant, implying that
the findings within the sampled neighborhoods may not reflect the general trend in the
entire universe of NSP neighborhoods. Within the examined neighborhoods, there is no
clear relationship between NSP spending and losses of intrinsic homes values. Moreover,
the descriptive data imply that there may not even be a deleterious contagion effect of
foreclosure measurable as a decline in appraised property values. In at least two of the
neighborhoods examined here, non-distressed home owners actually experienced
increases in relative value when their neighbors experienced foreclosure.
Foreclosure causes a decline in value to nearby properties. The following
hypothetical situation illustrates how the contagion effect of foreclosure can be measured
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by comparing the appraised values of neighboring properties. The property located at 123
Elm Street is valued at $200,000. Down the street, the house at 129 Elm Street is valued
at $220,000. Although the values rise and fall according to market trends, the difference
in value between the two homes remains fairly constant, all else being equal. In other
words, the difference in intrinsic value between the two homes is 10%.
Unfortunately, local real estate values fall by fifty percent. The family living at
129 Elm Street – in every other way equal to the family down the street – is $10,000
richer than the neighbors. All this changes when the family at 123 Elm Street
experiences a foreclosure. Six months after the foreclosure, the home sells for $90,000.
The foreclosure has several negative externalities. Taken together these spillover effects
constitute the contagion effect of foreclosure. Among these is the loss of wealth in the
form of home equity held by middle class families. All else being equal, the historic trend
would indicate that the home at 129 Elm Street will appraise for 110% of the appraised
value of 123 Elm, $99,000. In reality, however, the home is likely to appraise for 105%
of the neighboring value the year after the sale and 102% or less the year after. If, thirty
months after the foreclosure, 123 Elm appraises for $85,000, 129 Elm is likely to
appraise for $86,700 instead of $93,500. In other words, the household at 129 Elm is
$6,800 less wealthy because of the nearby foreclosure. This effect is amplified by the
overlapping effects of concentrated foreclosures that characterizes the current crisis, and
exacerbated by the other negative indicators or neighborhood wellbeing associated with
foreclosure. The cumulative effect is a massive loss of wealth to middle class families.
The federal government enacted the NSP, in part to contain this evaporation of
home values. The quantitative element of this research attempted to measure how

61

effectively the NSP mitigated the erosion of neighboring home values. The steps of this
process are explained below.
Pre-crisis
Property and Baseline Identified The first step to prepare for the
analysis was to isolate distressed properties, and nearby non-distressed properties. This
was done by identifying the lis pendens filed in each tract between 2007 and 2009, and
choosing its closest non-distressed neighbor. This was complicated by the fact that in
every neighborhood examined in this research distressed homes were clustered together.
Consequently the housing pairs are as close together as possible, although many are on
different streets.
Once the properties were identified I established a baseline difference in value.
Using county property appraiser valuations for the years 2000-2006 I determined the
consistent difference in value between the paired homes. The mean ratios of difference of
intrinsic value (MDIV) were determined by 1) averaging the appraised values of each for
the three years; and then 2) dividing the three-year-average appraised value of the nondistressed home by the appraised value of the distressed home. This ratio should reflect
the intrinsic difference in value between the two properties assuming there are no major
improvements and there is normal depreciation.

Mean Ratios of Difference of Intrinsic Value In the Collier County NSP
census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period of 2000-2006 was 1.1
([.88+1.06+1.16+1.27+1.13+1.48+1.31+1.07+.995+1.15+.98+1.07.5+.998]/13=1.
12221). In the non-NSP census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period of 2000-
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2006 was 0.92 ([.89+.76+1.25+1.23+.64+1.08+.93+.58+.87+
.996]/10=0.922908078).
In the Marion County NSP census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period
of 2000-2006 was 1.24 ([1.06+1.998+.82+1.37+.76+1.20+2.49+.85+1.13+.77]/10
=1.244419469). In the non-NSP census tracts the baseline MRDIV for the period
of 2000-2006 was 1.26 ([1.16+1.43+.96+1.21+.93+1.86]/6=1.258002955).
In the Rockledge NSP census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period of
2000-2006 was approximately 1.03 ([1.12+.90+.88+1.41+1.83+.52+
1.28+.81+.66+.84]/10=1.025029944). In the non-NSP census tract the baseline
MRDIV for the period of 2000-2006 was 0.94 ([.35+.75+.60+1.64+2.20+.61+
.85+.41+.94+1.04]/10=0.940062313).

Table 3 - Collier NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value

Collier NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2000-2006 average % of Distressed
neighbor

50,050

44,492 (88)

88%

43,700

46,392 (1.06)

106%

43,700

50,825 (116)

116%

44,492

56,683 (127)

127%

53,042

60,060 (113)

113%

55,575

82,444 (148)

148%

49,940

65,400 (131)

131%
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96,388

103,494 (107)

107%

143,299

142,602 (99.5)

100%

140,396

161,235 (115)

115%

186,269

183,432 (98)

98%

178,189

191,558

108%

(107.5)
18,525

18,500 (99.8)

100%

Table 4 - Collier Non-NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value

Collier Non-NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2000-2006 average % of Distressed
neighbor

184,998

164,005 (89)

89%

166,581

126,104 (76)

76%

136,152

170,351 (125)

125%

153,788

189,814 (123)

123%

318,475

203,120 (64)

64%

205,748

222,370 (108)

108%

194,280

181,584 (93)

93%

303,790

176,104 (58)

58%

176,712

153,826 (87)

87%

184,998

184,391 (99.6)

100%
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Table 5 - Marion NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value

Marion NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2000-2006 average % of Distressed
neighbor

59509

63205 (106)

106%

29563

59074 (199.8)

200%

63495

51843 (82)

82%

63495

86706 (137)

137%

72349

54797 (76)

76%

47462

57089 (120)

120%

42528

106024 (249)

249%

58750

49981 (85)

85%

48220

54581 (113)

113%

91651

70194 (77)

77%
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Table 6 - Marion Non-NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value

Marion Non-NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2000-2006 average % of Distressed
neighbor

78642

91331 (116)

116%

85527

122723 (143)

143%

68234

65169 (96)

96%

66344

80031 (121)

121%

66765

62328 (93)

93%

136469

253399 (186)

186%

Table 7 - Rockledge NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value

Rockledge NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2000-2006 average % of Distressed neighbor

73517

82240 (112)

112%

100990

91333 (90)

90%

117583

103080 (88)

88%

77463

109330 (141)

141%

66927

122317 (183)

183%

102313

53470 (52)

52%

81740

104560 (128)

128%

60793

49237 (81)

81%

105023

69033 (66)

66%

66

131683

110957 (84)

84%

Table 8 - Rockledge Non-NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value

Rockledge Non-NSP Tract 2000-2006 Average Value
Distressed Non-

2000-2006 average % of Distressed neighbor

Distressed
62617

21713 (35)

35%

67257

50340 (75)

75%

99763

59657 (60)

60%

45770

75203 (164)

164%

55860

123167 (220)

220%

87873

53490 (61)

61%

66290

56593 (85)

85%

147960

60867 (41)

41%

63400

59793 (94)

94%

65590

68377 (104)

104%
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Post-crisis
Test-year Mean Ratios of Difference of Intrinsic Value & Change in
Mean Ratios of Difference of Intrinsic Value After determining the baseline
MRDIV for each tract, I calculated the MRDIV for each tract for the year 2011,
as well as the change (Δ) in MRDIV for each tract. In the Collier County NSP
census tract the 2011 MRDIV was 1.1 ([.65+.63+.70+1.27+.77+2.04+
1.30+1.08+.99+1.31+ .81+1.06+1.67]/13=1.12221). The NSP tract Δ MRDIV
was 0.02316. In the non-NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was approximately
0.9 ([1.06+.72+1.23+ 1.06+1.03+1+.87+.50+.62+ .89]/10=0.899886883). The
non-NSP tract Δ MRDIV was 0.023021195.
In the Marion County NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was 1.3
([1.69+1.92+.94+1.45+.73+1.06+2.37+.90+1.23+.77]/10 = 1.311347594). The
NSP tract Δ MRDIV was -0.066928126. The NSP tract Δ MRDIV was
-0.064274806. In the non-NSP census tracts the 2011 MRDIV was approximately
1.27 ([1.04+1.48+ 1.03+1.20+ 1.07+1.78]/6= 1.267406515). The non-NSP tract Δ
MRDIV was -0.00940356.
In the Rockledge NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was approximately
1.09 ([.54+.89+.88+1.95+1.49+.51+1.52+1.15+ .67+1.29]/10= 1.08930475). In
the non-NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was 1.03 ([.26+.76+.85+2.46+1.96+
.87+ 1.11+.40+.82+.84]/10= 1.032250393). The non-NSP tract Δ MRDIV was
-0.09218808.
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Table 9 - Collier NSP Tract 2011 Values

Collier NSP Tract 2011 Values
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2011 average % of Distressed
neighbor

19,110

12,476 (65)

65%

20,424

13,009 (63)

63%

204,24

14,252 (70)

70%

12,476

15,895 (127)

127%

24,790

19,110 (77)

77%

25,974

53,079 (204)

204%

15,890

20,646 (130)

130%

63,319

68,485(108)

108%

91,791

90,541 (99)

99%

87,191

114,196 (131)

131%

114,697

92,763 (81)

81%

96,767

102,494 (106)

106%

5,195

8,658 (167)

167%
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Table 10 - Collier Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values

Collier Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values
Distressed Non-Distressed

2011 average % of Distressed
neighbor

131943

140516 (106)

106%

145380

105331 (72)

72%

94277

116307 (123)

123%

131577

139727(106)

106%

159842

165409 (103)

103%

167887

168301 (100)

100%

134883

116876 (87)

87%

263158

132530 (50)

50%

130560

80946 (62)

62%

131943

116949 (89)

89%
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Table 11- Marion NSP Tract 2011 Values

Marion NSP Tract 2011 Values
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2011 average % of Distressed
neighbor

41,417

70,380 (170)

170%

22,400

43,076 (192)

192%

47,951

45,304 (94)

94%

47,951

70,003 (146)

146%

59,910

43,866 (73)

73%

37,059

39,442 (106)

106%

34,072

81,067 (283)

238%

40,056

36,136 (90)

90%

39,289

48,419 (123)

123%

84,110

65,282 (78)

78%
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Table 12 - Marion Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values

Marion Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2011 average % of Distressed
neighbor

87,461

90,763

104%

99,402

146,660

148%

75,150

77,773

103%

77,723

93,556

120%

84,968

90,765

107%

158,611

283,029

178%

Table 13 - Rockledge NSP Tract 2011 Values

Rockledge NSP Tract 2011 Values
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2011 average % of Distressed
neighbor

87461

90763

104%

99402

146660

148%

75150

77773

103%

77723

93556

120%

84968

90765

107%

158611

283029

178%

87461

90763

104%

99402

146660

148%

72

75150

77773

103%

77723

93556

120%

Table 14 - Rockledge Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values

Rockledge Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values
Distressed

Non-Distressed

2011 average % of Distressed
neighbor

58980

15100

26%

70820

53590

76%

81790

69240

85%

36270

89250

246%

60460

118760

196%

65860

57170

87%

55610

61550

111%

147620

58950

40%

75860

62540

82%

85420

71720

84%

Regression Deeper analysis of how effectively NSP investments eased the impact
of foreclosure on neighboring home values required the use of linear regression. The
following linear regression was executed to determine the extent of the relationship
between NSP dollars spent and the Δ MRDIV: Y = a + bX; where X= NSP Expenditure
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(IV) and Y= Δ MRDIV (DV) using Slope(b) = ΣXY - [(ΣX)( ΣY)/n)] / ΣX2 – [(ΣX)2/n]
The results returned a Beta coeficcient of .854 that was not statistically signifcant (sig =
.348). The adjusted R-squared is 0.43, indicating that a substantial part of the variance in
Δ MRDIV within the NSP neighborhoods could be attributable to NSP expenditure. If the
sample better reflected the population (in this case neighborhoods with NSP expenditure)
one dollar of NSP spending could be expected to cause a .85 change in Δ MRDIV. The
level of statistical signifigance is so far outside of acceptable range, however, the
regression yields little usefull information to analyze the efficacy of NSP expenditure.
Appendix one contains a copy of the SPSS regression results.

Table 15 - Regression Variables

NSP Expenditure*

Δ MRDIV**

(X)

(Y)

37.8

0.02316

23.93

-0.066928126

10.2

-0.064274806
̅

23.97667

̅ = 0.073334
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Table 16 - Estimates

NSP Expenditure*

Δ MRDIV** (Y)

Y*X

X*X

(X)
37.8

0.08880

3.35664

1428.84

23.93

0.066928126

1.601590055

572.6449

10.2

0.064274806

0.655603021

104.04

ΣX = $ 71.93

ΣY =

ΣXY = $

ΣX2 = 2105.525

0.220002932

5.613833

*hundreds of thousands of dollars
**absolute value
Discussion This research began with the assumption that foreclosure adversely
affected the relative value of nearby properties. The contagion effect of foreclosure has
been documented by numerous researchers in planning and economics (Wassmer, 2010;
Wodka, 2009; Lee 2008; Lauria, 1998). The most concrete measurement of the contagion
effect was the decline in relative value of non-distressed homes as a result of
neighborhood discounting flowing from concentrated foreclosures. As a result, I asked
how well the NSP mitigated this effect. The data, however, do not reveal a contagion
effect. Moreover, in the one neighborhood-pair where there was a clear property value
related contagion effect, non-distressed homeowners in the NSP neighborhood (Golden
Gate Estates) experienced greater loss of relative value than non-distressed owners in the
non-NSP neighborhood (Naples Park). In Marion Oaks, Turning Point, Central
Rockledge, and Country Club Estates, non-distressed property owners experienced an
increase in appraised value relative to their distressed neighbors.
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Golden Gate Estates homeowners experienced a loss of relative value related to
the contagion effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was about 2.3% dropping from a
baseline average of 1.12 to 1.09 in 2011. A hypothetical home in Golden Gate Estates is
worth $100,000; the home next door is worth $112,000. The first home goes through
foreclosure. During the same time period there is a 30% decline in property values
overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the predicted value of the neighboring property would
be approximately $76,933 instead of $78,554. Therefore, the neighboring household has
lost $1,611 as a result of the contagion effect of foreclosure.
Naples Park homeowners experienced a loss of relative value related to the
contagion effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was also about 2.3% dropping from a
baseline average of .922 to .899 in 2011. A hypothetical home in Naples Park is worth
$100,000; the home next door is worth $92,200. The first home goes through foreclosure.
During the same time period there is a 30% decline in property values overall.
Considering the Δ MRDIV the predicted value of the neighboring property would be
approximately $44,950 instead of $46,100. Therefore, the neighboring household has lost
$1,150 as a result of the contagion effect of foreclosure.
Owners of non-distressed homes in Marion Oaks experienced an increase of
relative value in spite of their proximity to a concentration of foreclosures. The Δ
MRDIV was about -6.7% climbing from a baseline average of 1.244 to 1.311 in 2011. A
hypothetical home in Marion Oaks is worth $100,000; the home next door is worth
$124,441. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same time period there is
a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the predicted value
of the neighboring property would be approximately $65,550 instead of $62,205.
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Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $3,345 of value relative to the value of
the neighboring property.
Turning Point non-distressed homeowners experienced an increase of relative
value at a time of high foreclosure rates. The Δ MRDIV was practically infinitesimal,
approximately -.009% rising from a baseline average of 1.258 to 1.267 in 2011. A
hypothetical home in Turning Point Estates is worth $100,000; the home next door is
worth $124,441. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same time period
there is a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the
predicted value of the neighboring property would be approximately $126,700 instead of
$125,800. Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $900 of value relative to the
value of the neighboring property. These data indicate a high degree of neighborhood
stability.
Country Club Estates non-distressed property owners benefited from relative
property value increases when neighboring properties were affected by foreclosure. The
Δ MRDIV was approximately -6.4% rising slightly from a baseline average of 1.025 to
1.089 in 2011. A hypothetical home in Country Club Estates is worth $100,000; the home
next door is worth $102,503. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same
time period there is a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV
the predicted value of the neighboring property would be approximately $54,450 instead
of $51,250. Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $3,200 of value relative to
the value of the neighboring property.
Central Rockledge non-distressed property owners also saw their property values
increase when their neighbors went through foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was
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approximately -9.2% rising considerably from a baseline average of .94 to 1.032 in 2011.
A hypothetical home in Central Rockledge is worth $100,000; the home next door is
worth $94,000. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same time period
there is a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the
predicted value of the neighboring property would be approximately $51,600 instead of
$47,000. Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $4,600 of value relative to the
value of the neighboring property.
In “Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures” Scheutz,
Been, and Ellen indicate that real estate dynamics in New York City neighborhoods are
idiosyncratic and the observed effect of clustered foreclosures may not be generalizable
to other communities (Schuetz, et al, 2008). Local distinctiveness is not unique to New
York City. The home values of all neighborhoods are shaped by the economic and
cultural context of a broader community. It is likely that the contagion effect of
foreclosure exists and is measurable in terms of relative home value.
The specific market parameters of Country Club Estates and Marion Oaks deviate
from the overall trend. Moreover, the lack of statistical significance and the limited
sample size support the inference that a larger universe of properties, in a greater number
of neighborhoods would reveal trends that conform to the findings of previous
researchers. Unfortunately, in spite of the time and effort invested in the collection,
handling, and analysis of these data, they do not support any conclusive inferences
regarding how well the NSP reduces the loss of value to homes in neighborhoods with
high foreclosure rates.
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Chapter 7: Case Studies of Florida Jurisdictions Implementing NSP
Marion County Overview Marion County applied for and received a $6,324,055
NSP 1 grant (Marion County Community Services, 2009). More than 78% of that money
was spent on acquisition. Most of the balance was spent on residential renovation. The
program has generated substantial income, recovering more than 10% of the grant
amount in the end of the third quarter of 2011. This income has already been reinvested
into new acquisition and rehabilitation.
Marion County allocated funds to four areas: West Ocala, Marion Oaks, Rainbow
Park, and Silver Springs. West Ocala is an urban neighborhood immediately west of
downtown Ocala. Marion Oaks is a large master-planned community in the southern
portion of the county near the border of Sumter County. Rainbow Park is located in the
rural western portion of the county. Silver Springs is east of Ocala, adjacent to the Ocala
National Forest.
Under HUD guidelines, NSP grantees can outsource the implementation of the
program to partners with expertise in real estate acquisition, renovation, and property
management. Marion County elected to partner with a Gainesville based non-profit, the
Neighborhood Housing & Development Corporation (NHDC), as well as Habitat for
Humanity of Marion County, and another governmental entity, the Ocala Housing
Authority. Together, these entities acquired sixty-seven homes. Of those, the NHDC
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acquired and renovated forty-five (Marion County Community Services, 2009;
Thompson, 2011).
Located near the center of the state, Marion County is the focus of the equestrian
industry in Florida. Ocala is the county seat and largest city. Although only 16% of the
county’s population lives within the corporate boundaries of Ocala, my personal
observations and interactions with long-time residents indicates that the majority of
Marion County residents identify with the city.
Two factors collude to create the rural character of Ocala and Marion County.
First, the eastern portion of the county is dedicated to Ocala National Forest, creating a
permanent barrier to development and nurturing an economy based on nature-tourism.
Second, the predominate agricultural enterprise in the area, horse breeding, produces high
value agricultural land uses that create a markedly different dynamic than other parts of
the state.
The importance of the horse to the economy, culture and identity of Marion
County cannot be overstated. Throughout the area there are numerous public and private
displays of the community’s adoration for the animal. The downtown area is filled with
sculptures of horses funded by the Marion Cultural Alliance and the Florida
Thoroughbred Breeders’ and Owners Association (FTBOA) (Rogers, 2009). Citing a
2005 study by the American Horse Council, the FTBOA reports that 431 farms operate
70,000 acres in Marion County (Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' and Owners'
Association , 2011). Collectively, these enterprises, along with hobbyists, own a stock of
at least 35,300 horses. The horse farms and related industries (e.g. feed suppliers, training
centers, blacksmiths, etc.) have an annual economic impact on the county in excess of 1.3
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billion dollars, and have investments of $3.5 billion in land, equipment, supplies, and
livestock. Several championship racehorses were reared in Marion County. Each year,
horse enthusiasts from across the nation travel to Ocala for horse auctions, shows, and
competitions. According to the USDA census of agriculture, Marion County boasts the
largest inventory of “horses and ponies” in the United States and the second highest
market value for all livestock (United States Department fo Agriculture, 2007).
Additionally, hay and other forage grown in Marion County have the second highest
market value in the United States. Moreover, Ocala is the center of an equestrian
agglomeration, as horse related businesses benefit from locating near each other.
Equestrian activity is concentrated in the areas of the county west and north of Ocala.
Even at the height of the mid-2000s housing bubble, these land uses resisted market
pressures to use land for housing and exurban development. During the same time period
other parts of the state experienced market values for farm and pasture land well below
the market value for housing creating pressure to develop at the periphery.
Another important factor influences the development pattern in Marion County,
its proximity to The Villages. Located immediately to the south of Marion County, The
Villages is a master planned retirement community with 51,442 residents (United States
Census Bureau, 2011a). The entire community is age restricted, with a median age of
69.8. Residents of the Villages are middle-class to affluent retirees most of whom are
recent transplants from the Northeast and Midwest. According to the Census Bureau,
92.5% of the population of The Villages was born outside Florida; 11% of residents in
2010 did not reside in The Villages in 2009. The Census identifies 98.5% as White and
reports that 73.8% live in husband-wife households without children (2011). With mean
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incomes of $62,100 (21,755 from Social Security) the people of The Villages have
money to spend. For the most part, however, the workforce that serves The Villages
cannot reside within the community, and must commute. Estimates for the number of
workers commuting from southern Marion County to the Villages range from 1,043 –
8,000 (Lake-Sumter Metroplitain Planning Organization, 2011; Skolnik, 2011).
Consequently, the housing developments at the southern edge of Marion County function
as bedroom communities for the service industry in The Villages.

Figure 13 – Typical West Ocala Housing Stock

West Ocala West Ocala is a neighborhood immediately west of downtown Ocala.
Two compact census tracts are entirely within the neighborhood. Tract 17 is the western
portion of West Ocala and tract 18 is the eastern portion of the neighborhood, bounded by
downtown Ocala. Demographic, economic, and housing stock data from each tract are
presented here separately. The reason for this choice is that aggregating and averaging the
data obscures the difference in degree of racial segregation and poverty in the different
sections of the neighborhood.
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In census tract 17, non-Hispanic Whites comprise 14.8% of the population,
Hispanics of all races are 23.8% of the population, and a solid majority are Black or
African American at 59.5% of the population. According to the Census Bureau, the
median income is 22,484. Nearly one-third (31.4%) of the population earns less than
$15,000 per year. Owner-occupied homes account for 32.5% of households in tract 17.
Most of the homes were built after 1960, and 32.9% have been built since 2000. Of the
owner-occupied homes, 67.0% have a mortgage. Among renters, 57.9% of households
pay at least 35% of their monthly income for rent, while 44.5% of owner-occupied
households pay more than 35% of their monthly income for their mortgage payments.
Turnover is very high in census tract 17; 53.4% of residents moved into their homes after
2005. More than one out of five (20.6%) homes in census tract 17 is vacant.
In census tract 18, non-Hispanic Whites comprise 4.3 % of the population,
Hispanics of all races are 2.8% of the population, Black or African American accounts
for nearly all of the census tract’s population at 91.7% of the population. According to
the Census, the median income is $15,938. The median figure obscures the depth of West
Ocala’s poverty. Fully one-third (33.7%) of the households in census tract 18 earn less
than $10,000 per year. Owner-occupied homes account for 52.4% of households in tract
18. A majority of the housing stock (79.7% of homes) was built between 1940 and 1969.
Of the owner-occupied homes, 43.4% have a mortgage. The monthly costs of living in
the neighborhood as a portion of monthly income split markedly between owners and
renters. Among renters, 70.5% of households pay at least 35% of their monthly income
for rent. Only 12.6% of owner-occupied households allocate the same portion of their
monthly income to their mortgage payments. According to the American Community
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Survey (ACS), the median rent in the census tract is $510 per month, which is 61.22% of
the approximate gross monthly income of a family earning $10,000 per year. Turnover is
high, although it is less than half that of tract 17; 25.0% of residents moved into their
homes after 2005. The vacancy rate is 15.0%.
The vitality of West Ocala is hindered by the accumulated effects of systemic
racism. The neighborhood generally and census tract 18 specifically, is by far the least
diverse area examined in this research. It is also a place of vivid physical poverty. Much
of the building stock is substandard. When I visited the neighborhood, many if not most
of the homes I observed seemed subjectively unfit for habitation. Every roof shows
evidence of leaks; there are holes in exterior walls covered with corrugated metal and
plastic. Piles of building debris and household garbage fill lots between homes. There is
indoor furniture outside of nearly every home. The best maintained homes are secured
with burglar bars and perimeter fences. The elementary school that serves the area
received a grade of F from FLDOE. The High School received a C; the middle school an
A. Incidents of property crime in the neighborhood are numerous and correlate less
frequently to vacancy than in the other neighborhoods examined in this research.

84

Figure 14 - West Ocala Memorial to American slaves

The history of West Ocala is a tragic. In 1860 the majority of Marion County’s
population was comprised of African-American slaves, according to the City of Ocala
Historic Preservation office. Upon emancipation, a group of freedman settled in what is
now West Ocala when a former slave owner donated the land and funds to start a school
for children of freed slaves (City of Ocala, 2012). Over time, the Black majority grew.
During reconstruction a class of Black politicians and businessmen established
themselves as the city’s leadership. A black militia was organized to protect the
community during Reconstruction.
By 1872, Blacks comprised 65% of voters, and 73% of the population Marion
County (City of Ocala, 2012). The end of Reconstruction opened the door for the gradual
marginalization of the Black community in Ocala. Intimidation and de jure segregation
forced the Black community to retreat into West Ocala. The last Black city councilman
before the civil rights movement was elected in 1903 (Rawls, 2007). By 1936 only 500
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Blacks were registered to vote in Marion County. At the same time, steady population
growth led to a shift in the demographics of Ocala. By 1900 the proportion of Marion
County residents who were Black fell to 61 %, falling to 49% in 1930 (City of Ocala,
2012). Today, concentrated poverty characterizes West Ocala. The post-integration
suburbanization of upwardly mobile Black families to neighborhoods like Marion Oaks is
evaporating the human capital that remains in West Ocala.
Marion County’s NSP investment in West Ocala consists primarily of multifamily low income housing. Satisfying the low income housing requirement and
navigating local social and political realities appear to be the goals of the investment in
West Ocala. Containing the effects of foreclosure seems to be of secondary importance in
West Ocala, a neighborhood that by any objective measure struggled even before the
foreclosure crisis.
The real estate market in West Ocala does not function properly. Instead of
allocating land and money to the socially beneficial use, the market dynamic within the
neighborhood results in the continuous reproduction of an exploitative extraction of
wealth. The sharp contrast between the monthly housing costs of homeowners and renters
in West Ocala, combined with the poor state of the housing stock and the relatively low
proportion of owner-occupied homes secured by a mortgage, indicates that outside
property owners extract revenue from the neighborhood while investing little.
Homeowners likely have limited access to credit, and cannot invest in their properties.
Renters in the neighborhood likely have similar limited access to credit and therefore
cannot become homeowners. As a result, they must devote a large share of their monthly
income to rent. The market rents in West Ocala are similar to parts of Marion County
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which enjoy far superior housing stock reflecting a level of investment that justifies the
rental rate. Any increase in the rate of homeownership in the neighborhood would likely
interrupt the rent cash-flow out of the neighborhood. Interestingly, Marion County has
directed its NSP funds in Marion County to income qualified rental housing. Therefore,
NSP investment is likely to exacerbate the underlying problem: a lack of capital held by
West Ocala households.

Figure 15 - Fire damaged house in Marion Oaks

Marion Oaks Marion Oaks is a neighborhood in southern Marion County,
close to The Villages. The neighborhood if fairly diverse, with non-Hispanic Whites
comprising 47.3% of the population, Hispanics of all races 32.3%, and Black or African
American accounting for 19.7%. The median annual household income is $39,164. There
are 5,429 housing units in the neighborhood, 1,110 (20.4%) of which were vacant in
2010. Owner-occupied homes account for 73.1% of households in Marion Oaks. More
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than half (51.2%) of the homes were built between 1980 and 1999. Of the owneroccupied homes, 72.2% have a mortgage. Just under half (48.9%) of renter households
and a little over one-third (36.1%) of owner households apportion at least 35% of their
monthly income to rent or mortgage payments. Neighborhood turnover is high in Marion
Oaks; 39.8% of residents moved into their homes after 2005.

Figure 16 - Real Estate Owned (REO) in Marion Oaks

Marion Oaks consists primarily of single-family housing. The neighborhood is
visibly diverse and a large percentage of property records for the neighborhood have
Hispanic surnames. Evidently the developer originally planned to build multi-family
housing as well. At present, however, there is only one small multi-family building in
Marion Oaks which is far removed from the rest of the development. The streets have
sidewalks and lighting. Bicycle lanes are located on the primary collector streets. The
homes are block construction.
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Although many properties show the signs of deferred maintenance, pride of
ownership is visible throughout the neighborhood. Many properties are visibly vacant and
agent of mortgage-loan servicers have boarded up properties and posted documents
expressing their intent to secure the property. Property crime has increased dramatically
in recent years. When I visited I observed two homes on the same block badly damaged
by fire. The Star-Banner reports that a juvenile was arrested for arson in connection with
one of the fires. On another occasion there were fourteen burglaries in a two week period.
Although the targeted properties were not vacant, the rise in vacancy creates a lack of
“eyes in the street” watching vulnerable properties. The elementary school that serves the
neighborhood has fallen from a ‘B’ to a ‘C’ while the high school has risen from a ‘C’ to
a ‘B’ and the middle school has remained constant as a ‘C’ school.

Figure 17 - 150th Terrace Road, Rainbow Park, Marion County
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Rainbow Park Rainbow Park is a platted subdivision in the western portion of
Marion County, near Rainbow Spring State Park. Approximately 30 homes have been
built there. The plat recorded with the Marion County Clerk of Court and satellite
imagery show a complex system of streets radiating out from two center points at
diagonal lines. In reality, however, the best of these roads is improved with loose gravel
and most are merely paths created by car tires across wooded land. Oddly, these tracks all
have signage as if they were urban streets. There are even stop signs where the paths
intersect. Clearly the developer anticipated high demand for residential lots. The demand
never materialized and faded signs advertising lots for sale are obscured by trees. Many
of the “streets” are now impassible due to lack of traffic. Three Rainbow Park homes
have been purchased through the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. This investment
represents a significant portion of the housing stock in Rainbow Park.
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Figure 18 - SW 24th Street Rainbow Park

Rainbow Park is more than twenty miles from Ocala. Apart from a small
convenience store, there are no retail businesses nearby. The development is bounded on
all sides by working farms and equestrian facilities such as the Wavetree Stables,
Meadow Run Farms, Cayote Crossing Farms, Vanner Valley Farms, Ocala West Training
Facility, Nelson Jones Training Facility, and the Classic Mile Racetrack. These
businesses deal in the breeding, care, and training of show horses and race horses. The
market value for one of these animals exceeds that of the homes in Rainbow Park. In fact,
some of these enterprises have produced champion race horses whose single year
earnings exceed the NSP investment in the neighborhood. Consequently, there is little
incentive to allocate land in the area to the commercial uses necessary to support a
community of several thousand people. For this reason, Rainbow Park is likely to remain
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a neighborhood only on paper. Although it is an interesting place, observations from
Rainbow Park are only generalizable to a few areas where premium agricultural land uses
prevail over competing uses. Therefore, studying the neighborhood at length will add
little to our understanding of the neighborhood impacts of foreclosure or federal housing
policy.
Silver Springs Shores Silver Springs Shores is a neighborhood in eastern
Marion County, bordering Ocala National Forest. The neighborhood is racially and
ethnically diverse, with non-Hispanic Whites comprising 47.8% of the population,
Hispanics of all races 16.3%, and Black or African American accounting for 35.1%. The
demography of Silver Springs Shores stands out from other NSP neighborhoods in
several ways that are worth noting. First, fully 3% identify as two or more races, and
4.4% identify as “some other race.” In addition, while the median age is fairly young
(44.1) and 30.2% of households include minor children, 42.4% of households have senior
citizens present. More than one-third of the households in the neighborhood, 36.8%, are
non-families. Among the families, 13.3% are headed by single parents. Among those
households, about one-third are male householder families with no wife present, with
children under 18. In many ways Silver Springs Shores provides a glimpse of what
demographers presage the typical American neighborhood will look like by the next
decennial census.
In terms of income, Silver Springs Shores is more homogeneous; the median
annual household income is $35,103. Fifty percent of households in the neighborhood
earn between $25,000 and $75,000 per year. There are 3,449 housing units in the
neighborhood, 781 (22.6%) of which were vacant in 2010. Owner-occupied homes
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account for 68.9% of households in Silver Springs Shores. Most (81%) of the homes
were built between 1970 and 1989. Almost all are 3 bedroom homes. Of the owneroccupied homes, 66.8% have a mortgage. Just over half (51.8%) of renter households,
and more than half (50.3%) of owner households allocate at least 35% of their monthly
income to rent or mortgage payments. Neighborhood turnover is high in Silver Springs
Shores; 33.1% of residents moved into their homes after 2005.
Silver Springs Shores appears to be a healthy neighborhood. Apparently,
however, most households in the neighborhood simply cannot afford to live there. This is
especially true considering the average commute is 38 minutes and there is no public
transportation in the area. Nonetheless, a visitor to the neighborhood would not detect the
reality depicted in the statistics above. In spite of the affordability problem, residents take
pride in their homes and take an active interest in the wellbeing of the neighborhood.
When I visited the neighborhood I could find little evidence of the foreclosure crisis.
Homes for sale promoted their location and quality construction, not bargain prices.
While every other Marion County neighborhood had piles of discarded trash and building
materials dumped in vacant lots, I could find none in Silver Springs Shores. Perhaps most
telling, Silver Springs Shores is the only neighborhood I visited where adults took notice
of me visiting vacant and unsecured homes. Apart from a few instances of trespassing
and vandalism, I could not identify any increase in foreclosure related crime in Silver
Springs Shores. The schools that serve the neighborhood earn consistent ‘A’ and ‘B’
grades. The vacant NSP purchased homes were the only ones that appeared in need of
maintenance.
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Turning Point Census tract 009.01 is in southern Marion County, close to
Marion Oaks. It includes a development called Turning Point, and many single-family
homes scattered over a semi-rural area. The neighborhood if relatively homogenous with
regard to race and ethnicity, non-Hispanic Whites account for 74.8% of the population,
Hispanics of all races 15.3%, and Black or African American are 8.4%. The median
annual household income is $30,376. In terms of income, the Turning Point census tract
is the most heterogeneous examined in this research. The modal income category is
households earning less than $10,000 per year (15.5%). In the same area, 12.9% of
households earn between $50,000 and $74,000. The distribution is fairly flat, with very
few household earning more than $75,000.
There are 3,098 housing units in the neighborhood, 420 (13.6%) of which were
vacant in 2010. Owner-occupied homes account for 77.8% of households in the Turning
Point tract. A majority (59.9%) of the homes were built between 1980 and 1999. Of the
owner-occupied homes, a notably low percentage, 48% have a mortgage. More than half
(54.0%) of renter households and 45.3% of owner households spend at least 35% of their
monthly income to rent or mortgage payments. Neighborhood turnover is high, 31.4% of
residents moved into their homes after 2005.
There has been some controversy surrounding Marion County’s implementation
of NSP1. When the Marion County Commission voted to apply for an NSP3 grant, they
refused to re-contract with NHDC. Apparently Marion County paid NHDC more than
$7,000 in fees for every home it renovated and sold. In addition, the contractor paid
more than $35,000 per home for renovations (Thompson, 2011). The other major
contractor for Marion County, Habitat for Humanity, spent only $2,600 on each house
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(Thompson, 2011). The NHDC handled most of Marion County’s NSP 1 transactions.
The per unit fee structure would raise the net administrative costs above 10%, which is
prohibited under NSP guidelines. It is unclear whether HUD will seek to recapture any
NSP1 funds from Marion County.
Collier County Overview Collier County applied for and received a $7,306,755
NSP 1 grant (Collier County Housing & Human Services, 2010). More than 85% of that
money has been spent on acquisition, renovation, and land banking. The program
generated income of $738,243 by the end of the third quarter of 2011. To date, Collier
County has failed to fully fund the Low Income Housing element of its action plan,
spending only 22.8% of all funds on housing for those earning 50% or less of AMI
(Collier County Housing & Human Services, 2011).
Collier County is located in Southwest Florida. Naples, the principal city in
Collier County, is an extremely affluent community. The economy is based largely on
tourism, retail, construction, and healthcare. In addition, agriculture drives the economy
of the eastern portion of the county especially around the town of Immokalee. A
substantial portion of the county’s total area is undevelopable environmentally sensitive
land. Portions of the county are within the Corkscrew Regional Ecosystem Watershed,
the Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge, Picayune Strand State Forest, Collier
Seminole State Forest, Fackahatchee Strand State Preserve Park, Big Cypress National
Preserve, and Everglades National Park. Marco Island is a secondary community south of
Naples; it is a prosperous resort town. The tiny island towns of Chokoloskee and
Everglades City are located in the southern portion of the county. The two communities
are completely surrounded by environmentally sensitive land and waterways.
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Locals colloquially refer to most of the populated area of the county as ‘Naples’
despite the fact that the actual City of Naples is fairly compact. All of the Collier County
neighborhoods examined here are in the unincorporated county. Although they all have
mailing addresses of ‘Naples’ and are referred to as such by those who live there, they are
not part of Naples. In fact, parts of Golden Gate Estates are thirty miles from downtown
Naples.
East of Naples is a development called Golden Gate City, which despite its name
is located in unincorporated Collier County. The neighborhood, home to a large portion
of the county’s workforce, has experienced an ethnic shift over the last two decades. In
2000, Hispanics of all races accounted for 37.1% of the population of Golden Gate City,
Black or African American accounted for only 10.2% of the population, and nonHispanic Whites comprised 49.6% of the population (United States Census Bureau,
2011d). In 2010 those numbers were 58.5%, 17.2%, and 24.2% respectively (United
States Census Bureau, 2011). Development began in the 1970’s, and the area was built
out by the late 1990’s. In the 2000s, development shifted north and east into an area
known as Golden Gate Estates, a sprawling 80 square mile plat, much of which is not
buildable due to seasonal flooding.
East of Golden Gate Estates is land still held by Barron Collier Companies (BCC)
named for its founder Barron G. Collier, the developer for whom Collier County is also
named. Part of that land includes 25,000 acres currently being developed in conjunction
with businessman and philanthropist Tom Monaghan, founder of Domino’s Pizza and
Ave Maria University.
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In 2004 Monaghan and BCC announced their plans to build a new town centered
around a catholic university, law school, and seminary. Monaghan committed $400
million dollars to the project and the Colliers committed the 25,000 acres including a
substantial conservation easement as well as promises to provide necessary infrastructure
(Sollitto, 2004, p. 68; Meadows, 2006). The developers projected construction of 5,120
homes between 2007 and 2012. As of February 2012, only 374 have been built (Freeman,
2012). In 2006 Monaghan proposed that Ave Maria would eventually have 11,000 homes
and local business leaders expected the development to trigger growth throughout eastern
Collier County (Meadows, 2006). For several years the buzz around Ave Maria drove
speculation in Golden Gate Estates, situated between Naples and Ave Maria, inflating
home and land values.
The County experienced tremendous growth in the first decade of the TwentyFirst Century. The population grew from 246,589 in 2000 to 321,520 in 2010 (United
States Census Bureau, 2011c; United States Census Bureau, 2011b). The 30% increase
followed a similar increase in the 1990s creating high demand for housing.
Golden Gate/Golden Gate Estates Golden Gate Estates remains mostly vacant.
Originally platted in 1966, the first homes were built in the 1970’s (WR Wilson &
Associates Inc, 1966). Most lots are 2.5 acres with considerable setbacks. Although there
are probably several thousand people living in Golden Gate Estates, there are few
publicly provided urban services. Households rely upon wells and septic tanks and only a
handful of streets have lighting. Collier County does provide trash pick-up and the
Sheriff’s Department maintains a substation in the neighborhood. Currently, the area is
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served by its own fire-district; however, there is a strong possibility that services will be
consolidated with another low-density area to the south (Freeman, 2012).
Unfortunately, because the community is not a Census Designated Place (CDP) it
is difficult to ascertain demographic and housing information. The Census website
AmericanFactFinder reveals that census tracts 104.5 and 104.7, which partially comprise
Golden Gate Estates, have roughly 9,206 residents. However, the Golden Gate Estates
Area Civic Association (GGEACA) claims a population of 36,000. The census reports
that in the two tracts examined, non-Hispanic Whites account for 79.1% of the
population, Hispanics of all races 13%, and Black or African American 6.6%. Personal
observation suggests that the neighborhood’s population is about half what the GGEACA
claims, and that the Hispanic population must be larger. Personal observation also
indicates that there is a tendency for Hispanics to settle in the eastern portion of Golden
Gate Estates and for non-Hispanics to settle in the western half. The existing homes are
mostly in the western half of Golden Gate Estates and home values drop dramatically
moving east. Collier County property appraiser records indicate that the building stock
ranges in age from 0-30 years old in the western half of the neighborhood, and rarely
exceeds 10 years old in the eastern half.
Naples Park Naples Park is a working class neighborhood immediately north of
Naples. It is bounded on the west and south by very exclusive affluent neighborhoods.
The demographic profile roughly matches that of the county as a whole with nonHispanic Whites comprising 72.5% of the population, Hispanics of all races 22.6%, and
Black or African American slightly underrepresented at 2.5% (United States Census
Bureau, 2011f). There are 3,117 housing units in the neighborhood, 511 (16.4%) of
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which were vacant in 2010. Owner-occupied homes account for 52.5% of households in
Naples Park. Nearly three-quarters (73.9%) of the homes were built between 1970 and
1989. Of the owner-occupied homes 67.2% have a mortgage. The majority (63.7% or
renters and 53.3% of owners) of households pay at least 35% of their monthly income to
rent or mortgage payments. There is high turnover, nearly a third (32.8%) of residents
moved in to their homes after 2005 (United States Census Bureau, 2011e).
The Department of Housing and Urban Development initially rejected the
County’s application for NSP funds. The Collier Housing and Human Services
Department submitted seven applications before receiving approval (Collier County
Housing & Human Services, 2010). Unfortunately, implementation has followed the
same pattern and the Collier neighborhood stabilization program may be the most
troubled in the state.
Any major policy implementation will have its share of problems. Unfortunately,
NSP is no exception. Collier County is a cautionary tale. The community development
director there was demoted, ultimately forced to resign, and may face criminal
prosecution for mishandling NSP funds (Naples NBC-2, 2011). According to local news
reports, contractors recounted inappropriate billing procedures and possible fictitious
expenses. Once the media heard the story local television news crews broadcast images
of homes in serious disrepair where remodeling had stopped. Eager to uncover a scandal,
the local newspaper revealed that a convicted sex-offender was working as a contractor
on NSP properties (Albers, 2011). While the Collier County public may not have been
aware of NSP until the story broke, the scandal discredits the entire program.
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The Collier County Property Appraiser reports that in 2006 the market value of all
appraised real property in the county rose 30.81% to $102,357,800,980. That year marks
the climax of eight years of double digit percentage increases. In 2007 the rate of increase
fell dramatically to 5.45%. The following year values began to contract, with growth at
5.72% and that trend has continued through 2011. Between 2007 and 2011 the total
appraised value of real property in Collier County fell by nearly 35% to $70,336,762,793.
Naples Park and Golden Gate City follow this pattern and generally saw a rise and
fall in property values roughly proportionate to the rise and fall of real estate values
overall. Golden Gate Estates, however, experienced inflation and subsequent collapse of
land values far greater than the rest of the County. This is likely attributable to the
speculation surrounding the development of Ave Maria. Naples Park appears to be a
stable neighborhood. Golden Gate appears to be transitioning, but in a predictable and
community affirming manner. In spite of NSP spending in Golden Gate Estates, however,
the community’s identity has been undermined. For decades the neighborhood was
associated with semi-rural affordable living at the periphery, an alternative to the
polished deed restricted neighborhoods of Naples. The expectation that Golden Gate
Estates would occupy the space between Ave Maria and Naples rapidly transformed the
neighborhood. Then, when it became apparent that the town of Ave Maria would be slow
to materialize, Golden Gate Estates experienced abandonment of land and half-finished
projects were left idle. A handful of arms-length voluntary acquisitions and renovations
has done little if anything to reverse the trend and stabilize Golden Gate Estates.
A search of Collier County code enforcement records on select streets with
several distressed properties revealed that there has been an enormous spike in
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complaints to code enforcement in all of the Collier County neighborhoods examined
here (Collier County Growth Management Division - Planning and Regulation, 2012).
The code enforcemnt cases are frequently intiiated by a neighbor complaint. In Golden
Gate Estates, many violations have not been corrected, in some cases for years. In the
other neighborhoods, involving code enforecemnet appears to induce compliance.
Brevard – Rockledge Overview Through an interlocal agreement, Brevard
County administers the NSP and other housing and community services in the City of
Rockledge. Brevard County applied for and received a $5.2 million NSP 1 grant (Brevard
County Housing & Human Services, 2010). Of that money, approximately $1,020,000
has been spent directly in Rockledge. Brevard County’s quarterly reports and public
records of real estate transactions and notices of commencement naming Brevard County
and its contractors as parties to a transaction indicate that the funds allocated to
Rockledge were all spent in the census tract containing Country Club Estates. Nearly all
the funds have been spent on acquisition and renovation1. Countywide the program
generated income of $649,926 by the end of the third quarter of 2011. Brevard County
has not yet met its obligations under the Low Income Housing element of its action plan,
spending 24.8% of all funds on housing for those earning 50% or less of AMI (Brevard
County Housing and Human Services, 2011).
Brevard County is located on the East Coast of Central Florida and is the center of
the region often referred to as the “Space Coast.” Cape Canaveral Space Center and

1

My estimate of the funds allocated to Rockledge is based on itemized expenditures within the city.
Therefore it excludes administrative costs, almost always 10% of the total grant amount, which are not
itemized in the quarterly reports. Brevard has committed no funds to land-banking and little to
demolition.

101

Patrick Air Force base are both located in Brevard County. Additionally, the County’s
beach communities are a destination for surfers and other tourists.
Rockledge is in the southernmost portion of the County’s mainland. The economy
is based largely on tourism and retail. Although Rockledge is the oldest city in Brevard
County, it lives in the shadow of its famous neighbors, communities renowned for their
beaches as well as their military and aerospace intuitions. The western edge of Rockledge
is bounded by environmentally sensitive land. Specifically, the River Lakes Conservation
Area limits the City’s westward growth. The Indian River Lagoon forms the eastern
boundary of the City. Other municipalities bound the City on the north (Cocoa) and south
(Melbourne).
The demographic profile differs slightly from that of Brevard County as a whole
with non-Hispanic Whites comprising 74.5% of the population, Hispanics of all races
slightly overrepresented at 6.4%, and a concentration of Black or African American
relative to Brevard County as a whole at 15.7%. Rockledge enjoys a median income
18.38% higher than Brevard County as a whole (74,626/63,039).
Central Rockledge is a neighborhood southeast of the Barton Boulevard and
Fiske Boulevard intersection. In the census tract that contains Central Rockledge, nonHispanic Whites comprise 78.4% of the population; Hispanics of all races are only 3.0%,
and Black or African American account for 13.6%. According to the Census, the median
income is 66,819. Owner-occupied homes account for 84.3%of households in Central
Rockledge. More than half (54.1%) of the homes were built between 1980 and 1999. Of
the owner-occupied homes 73.0% have a mortgage. Owner and renter households in
Central Rockledge experience dissimilar housing costs as a portion of monthly income.
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Among renters, 54.8% of households pay at least 35% of their monthly income for rent.
Only 19.7% of owner-occupied households allocate the same portion of their monthly
income to their mortgage payments. Compared to other communities, Central Rockledge
is relatively stable; 20.1% of residents moved in to their homes after 2005. The most
recent American Community Survey reports that 14.8% of the housing units in the census
tract containing Central Rockledge are vacant.
Central Rockledge is something of a surprise. It is in an urban area, in a part of
the state that has been long settled. Moreover, close proximity to the water often
correlates with neighborhood prosperity. Central Rockledge, however, is characterized by
blighted commercial properties, and manufactured homes. The commercial spaces have
ubiquitous and senseless graffiti. A local drug store has been converted to a night club
whose signage is hand painted on a sheet of plywood. While some parts of the
neighborhood appear well maintained, much of the building stock is long past its usable
life. More importantly, there appears to be no neighborhood cohesion. Different sections
of the neighborhood are accessible from different collector streets and moving through
the neighborhood in a vehicle is difficult. There are no sidewalks and most of the
residential streets lack lighting. Some streets have well maintained sitebuilt homes, while
others have dated single-wide trailers.
Country Club Estates is northwest of the Barton Boulevard and Fiske Boulevard
intersection. In the census tract that contains Country Club Estates non-Hispanic Whites
comprise 66.9% of the population, Hispanics of all races are 4.6%. Black or African
American accounts for 27.6% of the population, a high concentration relative to
neighboring census tracts. According to the Census Bureau, the median income is 47,288,
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nearly 30% below that of the neighboring census tract. Owner-occupied homes account
for 86.1% of households in Country Club Estates. A little less than half (44.9%) of the
homes were built between 1970 and 1989. Of the owner-occupied homes 73.0% have a
mortgage. The majority (49.5% of renters and 45.0% of owners) of households pay at
least 35% of their monthly income to rent or mortgage payments. There is modest
turnover; 24.2% of residents moved in to their homes after 2005. According to the most
recent American Community Survey, 13.5% of the homes in the census tract containing
Country Club Estates are vacant.
An uninformed visitor to Country Club Estates would not know that the
neighborhood has been so severely impacted by the foreclosure crisis. The homes are all
well maintained. There are sidewalks and lighted streets. The only indication of trouble is
that several properties have sheets of paper displayed on the windows indicating that they
are bank owned. The papers include emergency contact information in case there is a
problem with the property. Code enforcement information indicates that the City of
Rockledge has begun maintaining some of the bank owned properties and taken liens to
recover expenses. There is an active community watch which participates in a program
through the Rockledge Police Department to maintain a list of vacant homes and ensure
that neighbors and police officers routinely check on the properties.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
The conclusion of this research is presented in three parts. The first section is an
acknowledgment of the limitations of this research, specifically the elements of the
research design that limit the generalizability of the findings. The second summarizes and
synthesizes the findings of this research relating it back to the theoretical framework
outlined in Chapter Three. The final section includes policy implications highlighting the
strengths and weaknesses of NSP implementation in Florida and indicates some of the
lessons that might inform future neighborhood policy and planning practice.
Limitations The chief limitation of this research is its narrow focus on a small
number properties in a handful of neighborhoods. A larger sample of neighborhoods and
properties may provide better insights into the effectiveness of direct market participation
to mitigate the decline in value experienced by homeowners adjacent to a foreclosure.
This work yields deep contextual insights into the neighborhoods examined here. The
quantitative portion of this research did uncover the uneven discounting of home values
in six neighborhoods through the period of speculative inflation and subsequent decline.
Nonetheless, it remains handicapped by the very small n. A research design that
employed the same methodology but relied upon a larger n – perhaps thousands of homes
in a hundred neighborhoods across the Sunbelt – may reveal patterns in greater
conformity with the literature and support more conclusive findings as to whether the
NSP has successfully stabilized the discounting of homes in neighborhoods with high
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foreclosure rates. Such a study would be less susceptible to localized aberrations and
could measure trends in the abstract real estate market.

The research question itself may rest on a false premise. Although there is
academic consensus among those researchers who study foreclosure that there is such a
contagion effect, their research has been limited to severely impacted areas in the middle
of market corrections (Schuetz et al, 2008; Wassmer, 2010; Immerrgluck 2011;
Immergluck, 2009b ). Long-range study using a broader sampling frame may show that
there is no home value contagion effect to mitigate. This research seems to imply that the
underlying dynamics of local real estate markets have more to do with comparative home
values than national trends in the rate of default and foreclosure.
Trends in home values are extremely localized. As mentioned in Chapter Five,
Scheutz, Been, and Ellen commented that the market for homes in New York City
neighborhoods is distinctive and not easily compared to other places. They posit that
phenomena observed in correlation to concentrated foreclosures may not be generalizable
to other communities (Schuetz, et al, 2008). Despite the distinctiveness of New York
City, local distinctiveness is not unique to any particular city. The home values of all
neighborhoods are shaped by the economic and cultural contexts of a broader
community. In every part of the county impacted by the housing bubble of the mid2000s, there is likely to be neighborhoods similar to Golden Gate Estates. In every part of
the country with a history of racial segregation, or exclusion of immigrants from existing
communities, or ethnic balkanization, or economic inequality among an otherwise
homogenous population, there exists a neighborhood like West Ocala.
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It is likely that the contagion effect of foreclosure exists and is measurable in
terms of relative home value. Nonetheless, a singular focus on valuation obscures the
conditions of actual neighborhoods in which real people live. A flaw in the research
design is the conceptual separation of the various elements of the contagion effect of
foreclosure and overdependence on property values to operationalize the contagion effect
of foreclosure. More time and foresight would have allowed for greater integration of the
findings into a cohesive narrative of the impacts of the housing bubble, the foreclosure
crisis, and the NSP intervention.
Finally, personal observation has limited utility as a research tool. Although the
site visits used for this research were thorough and systematic, they are imperfect. My
ability to observe a neighborhood was limited by time and the enormity of the task. An
individual researcher working alone has limited opportunity to engage the character of a
neighborhood. Moreover, any observations I make are, of course, filtered through a
particular embodied consciousness. I am a White Anglophone male of a particular age
acculturated within a certain social context. As such, I may not have appreciated subtle
clues and signals of neighborhood vitality or decline in communities markedly different
from my own. Although I tried to be as perceptive as possible and to couch my
observations in history and descriptive statistics, it is possible that I failed to note an
important indicator of neighborhood wellbeing. In addition, the cross-sectional nature of
the observations is limiting. For instance, one of the indicators of neighborhood
wellbeing I looked for was illegal dumping, especially around vacant or foreclosed
properties. It is possible that in the neighborhoods I visited with few illegal dumping sites
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cleanup crews had visited the day before. Similarly, homes I saw in a state of disrepair
may be renovated over the next year.
Summary of Findings The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has
modest or no neighborhood level impact on the contagion effect of foreclosure as
measured by home values and other metrics of neighborhood wellbeing. This research
cannot support a conclusion that the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has
effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure as measured by home values.
The NSP does not appear to have any effect on crime. Counter intuitively, NSP spending
correlates to an increase in citations for code violations.
Generally, the NSP appears to have failed to stabilize neighborhoods floundering
in the wake of the foreclosure crisis. In West Ocala and Golden Gate Estates the NSP
may have actually had a detrimental effect on neighborhood wellbeing. At the same time,
the NSP augmented the coordinated efforts of residents and local government to stabilize
a few neighborhoods. In particular, Silver Springs Shores and Country Club Estates
appear to have benefited from NSP spending. The effects of NSP 1 are less clear in the
other neighborhoods examined here.
In Collier County NSP expenditure did little to mitigate the loss in value of nondistressed homes relative to foreclosed homes. In Golden Gate Estates, an NSP
neighborhood, homeowners experienced a loss of relative value related to the contagion
effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was about 2.3% dropping from a baseline average of
1.12 to 1.09 in 2011. In Naples Park, a non-NSP neighborhood, homeowners experienced
a loss of relative value related to the contagion effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was
also about 2.3% dropping from a baseline average of .922 to .899 in 2011. Therefore, in
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Collier County, Golden Gate Estates homeowners experienced no discernible benefit
from the NSP as measured by home values.
In Marion County, NSP expenditure may have benefited homeowners in NSP
neighborhoods. Generally, the contagion effect is depicted as a loss of relative value
resulting from nearby foreclosures. Successful intervention to mitigate the effect would
show less decline in relative value in neighborhoods selected for intervention when
contrasted with neighborhoods that were not selected. In Marion County, however,
distressed properties endured such deep discounting that non-distressed properties
actually increased in value. Owners of non-distressed homes in Marion Oaks – an NSP
neighborhood – experienced an increase of relative value in spite of their proximity to a
concentration of foreclosures. The Δ MRDIV was about -6.7% climbing from a baseline
average of 1.244 to 1.311 in 2011. Nearby in Turning Point – a non-NSP neighborhood –
non-distressed homeowners experienced a minute increase of relative value at a time of
high foreclosure rates. The Δ MRDIV was practically infinitesimal, approximately
-.009% rising from a baseline average of 1.258 to 1.267 in 2011. While this may indicate
that NSP intervention succeeded in Marion Oaks, it may also be illustrative of the
severity of Marion Oaks’s decline. Buyers place such a low value on distressed homes in
Marion Oaks that a bifurcated market has emerged, one for distressed homes, one for
non-distressed homes. Eventually these sub-market trends will converge. It is likely that
as time goes on and valuations are reassessed based on comparable sales, the nondistressed segment of the neighborhood will adjust downward.
In Rockledge NAP spending benefited the receiving neighborhood. However, the
NSP appears to have bolstered an already healthy neighborhood. Although Country Club
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Estates has a high concentration of distressed properties, the contagion effect is limited.
In Country Club estates non-distressed property owners benefited from relative property
value increases when neighboring properties were affected by foreclosure. The Δ
MRDIV was approximately -6.4% rising slightly from a baseline average of 1.025 to
1.089 in 2011.
In Central Rockledge, an immediately adjacent non-NSP neighborhood, nondistressed property owners also saw their property values increase when their neighbors
went through foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was approximately -9.2% rising considerably
from a baseline average of .94 to 1.032 in 2011. Again, these data highlight the
underlying weakness of Central Rockledge and the strength of Country Club Estates.
Interestingly, the implementing authorities in Brevard County appear to have selected
comparatively healthy neighborhoods for NSP expenditure (among the neighborhoods
with high enough foreclosure rates to qualify for the funds). The apparent rationale that
the limited resources should be expended in neighborhoods best positioned to benefit
from the intervention appears to be paying off.
Within the three NSP neighborhoods examined in the quantitative section it is
unclear how much of the Δ MRDIV is attributable to NSP expenditure. The Beta
coeficcient of the linear regression was .854. Therefore the model could explain a
substantial portion of the variation. However, because the sample may not reflect the
population (all neighborhoods receiving NSP funds) it is unclear how much of the
variation is caused by NSP spending. The results do suggest that the effect of NSP
spending could be significant if the sample was more reliable as regression returned an Rsquared of 0.43. Even if the regression results had provided more conclusive results,
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however, the directionality would confound the analysis. This research began with the
well founded assumption that concentrated foreclosure results in a loss of relative value
to non-distressed homes. In some of the neighborhoods examined here, however, nondistressed homes actually increased in value.
Neighborhood Stabilization expenditure appears to have no effect on crime. Bess,
as well as Immergluck and Smith observed changes in the type and incidence of crime in
Chicago and Charlotte. Immergluck and Smith demonstrated conclusively that crime
becomes more common as the foreclosure rate increases. Meanwhile Bess showed that
as the inventory of distressed homes increases, the nature of property crimes becomes
more severe and occur more often in conjunction with violent offenses.
There is a crime contagion effect of foreclosure. Marion and Collier County crime
date indicates that streets with multiple lis pendens experience increases in property
crime. In these counties, however, it is the neighborhoods with the highest NSP
expenditures that show the greatest increases in crime. Many of the offenses are minor;
they often involve juveniles, and they usually relate to the presence of vacant housing.
The most severe incident I found was an arson in Marion Oaks. More homes were
acquired through the NSP in Marion Oaks than in any other neighborhood I examined.
The NHDC spent much more on renovation per house than any other grantee. The reality
is that vacancy creates opportunity for mischief that escalates into criminal acts.
Neighborhood Stabilization Funds are targeted to neighborhoods with high vacancy rates.
The size of the NSP investment is inadequate to take possession of all, or even most, of
the vacant homes in severely affected neighborhoods. Moreover, most of the NSP
acquired properties in the neighborhoods examined here sat vacant for several months
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after the grantees acquired them. Many remain vacant in early 2012. To contain the
contagion effect of foreclosure qua crime, housing policy must be tailored to address the
problem of vacancy, especially in suburban neighborhoods.
There is no apparent relationship between NSP expenditure and school quality.
The performance of public schools correlates with economic factors and NSP allocations
have not had an impact of school performance. With rare exception, schools serving NSP
areas perform as they performed in the years before the NSP expenditure.
The NSP has had a detrimental impact on affordability, except for a small handful
of direct beneficiaries. For modest income families, the NSP has absorbed inventory and
over-improved properties that would have otherwise been discounted by the market. In
every neighborhood examined here the cost of housing amounts to a substantial portion
of monthly household income. Increased affordability without burdensome financing is
the key to effective and sustainable neighborhood stabilization. The NSP has done little
to reduce the household costs of living in the ten neighborhoods examined here.
Policy Implications As mentioned above, the NSP has had a negative overall
effect on housing affordability. While some households have received direct housing
assistance, they comprise a practically infinitesimal minority. For low income and middle
income families, the NSP has absorbed inventory and over-improved properties that
would have otherwise been discounted by the market. In every neighborhood examined
here the cost of housing amounts to a substantial portion of monthly household income.
This dynamic disincentivizes new household formation and holds vacancy rates high. The
most practical way to secure vacant homes and therefore prevent increased property
crime is to place people in the vacant housing. The most effective way to put people in
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those homes is to directly subsidize housing in neighborhoods above a certain vacancy
threshold. At the federal level a future neighborhood stabilization policy designed to
achieve nationwide results might transform the home mortgage interest tax deduction into
a refundable tax credit available to households earning up to 120% of AMI. Such a policy
would be self-funding with revenues collected further up the income ladder, drastically
reduce the cost of implementation by directly subsidizing households, and complement
the prevailing political philosophy by emphasizing the private housing choices of
households rather than bureaucratic caprice.
Additionally, local policy makers could consider enacting ordinances that place
moratoria on the production of new housing units when vacancies cross a threshold that
endangers neighborhood stability. Such a proactive policy would prevent the
destabilization of healthy neighborhoods in the first place. It would also encourage
investment in existing housing stock and trigger real appreciation in home values.
Temporary local housing moratoria, in tandem with policies to provide real housing
choices to low-income households, would achieve the long term goal of neighborhood
stability.
The tide of neighborhood stabilization policy is in constant flux and vulnerable
neighborhoods always pay the price of poorly implemented policy. The foreclosure crisis,
however, threatens to undermine the free alienability of real property that makes the real
estate market function. It also promises to tear the social fabric of neighborhoods across
the country. The societal impact of the current crisis is not confined to the poor, the
elderly, and minorities like the 1990s foreclosure crisis (Immergluck, 2006) . The impact
on the physical form of every neighborhood, new and old, rich and poor, from the inner-
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city to the exurbs, is potentially crippling. Unbelievably, the only federal policy explicitly
targeting the problem is woefully inadequate and completely unintelligible to the average
person. It would be better to do nothing than deliver false hope to communities in need,
and the nation cannot afford to do nothing.
There is probably no other policy area that is characterized by such inconsistency
and waywardness. Grants to local law enforcement to eradicate marijuana are clearly
related to the overriding national goal of controlling the illicit drug trade; a grant to equip
an airport with metal detectors is clearly related to the overriding federal goal of national
security. In both cases, changes in ends and means of implementation are predictable and
incremental. The apparent goal of NSP 1, however, was to slow the economic contraction
and minimize the contagion effect of foreclosure. Through the legislative process and
implementation, the program – with just a few billion dollars spread across the entire
country – was intended to stimulate GDP growth, eliminate blight, and provide lowincome housing.
Overall, NSP1 has been a failure. A more effective and direct policy to address
the foreclosure crisis would be to directly subsidize the occupancy of vacant housing and
reduce the costs of housing to households. The macro-level goals of the program were illdefined and contradictory. In the jurisdictions examined here the process of incremental
implementation by local governments and their contractors either compounded the
problems created by foreclosure or had no effect at all. In the Etzioni mixed scanning
framework, clear macro-level goals become guiding principles for micro level
implementation.
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A more effective neighborhood stabilization program and more thoughtful
housing policy generally, must come from the political process. Holzer’s proposition that
planners and public managers should “steer” the “ship of the state” is deeply flawed
Bureaucratic managers may have the expertise necessary to formulate fact-driven policy,
but they lack democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the reality that elected legislatures and
executives control the budgets of public entities negates managerial decision making at
the macro-level. Nonetheless, those who row the “ship of the state” make the
incremental decisions that ultimately determine the success or failure of a policy. For this
reason, no public policy can conform to Banfield’s articulation of the Rational Planning
Model. The need for democratic legitimacy will introduce non-rational goals and
motivations. A substantive policy area like housing and neighborhood integrity, which
elicits deeply personal reactions, needs political as well as technical feasibility. Synoptic
planning in housing policy is also especially vulnerable to the question of who defines
rationality. Lindblom’s prescription to “muddle through” the implementation of
politically viable programs is unhelpful. If this research shows anything conclusively it is
that the path of least resistance yields no measurable results. Local governments
implementing a national policy in a short period of time simply channeled federal funds
into the well-worn paths of suburban sprawl and racial exclusion.
Mixed scanning provides an evaluative framework to understand the efficacy of
the NSP in Florida. The goals of NSP 1 were never clear. Not only were the multiple
goals vague, they were at times contradictory. Micro-level actors were given no
directives as to how to prioritize the goals and identify opportunities for selective
application of the most attainable highest value policy goal. Moreover, the public and
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private entities tasked with local implementation used the national policy goals primarily
to write their action plans. Once they had the money in hand, for the most part, they went
for easy acquisitions and over allocated funds to renovation of properties with low
intrinsic market value. Simultaneously containing the contagion effect of foreclosure in
middle class neighborhoods, and providing affordable housing to families to families
earning 50% of AMI, through the same properties, only exacerbates the problem of
neighborhood division and decline.
The Etzioni two tiered framework indicates two important ways to avoid the
mistakes of NSP 1 in future housing policy implementation. First, officials at the national
level – both within the political process and through directives from HUD – can
prioritize their goals and provide direction for resource allocation when local
implementation cannot practically achieve all policy goals simultaneously. Second, at the
local level, administrators can confine their incremental choices to a menu of realistically
attainable benchmarks. For instance, they can choose to adopt a strategy to either a)
leverage existing networks and channel fund flows into several neighborhoods with the
social and physical infrastructure to restore their stability (e.g. Silver Springs Shores and
Country Club Estates); or, b) singularly focus upon one neighborhood with high intensity
to break out of an advanced cycle of decline (e.g. West Ocala). These changes would
affirm the pragmatic incremental decisions of micro-level administrators while also
conforming implementation to the macro-level priorities determined through the political
process.
The two NSP neighborhoods examined here that actually appear to have
stabilized, Silver Springs Shores, and Country Club Estates, were fundamentally healthy
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communities before the crisis. They benefit from high social capital, quality building
stock, and desirable locations. In Country Club Estates these neighborhood assets were
leveraged through a comprehensive response from the Rockledge city government that
went beyond the NSP. Sadly, the neighborhoods that languished before the foreclosure
crisis, especially West Ocala and Golden Gate Estates, appear to be victims rather than
beneficiaries of the NSP.
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Appendix One: Regression
Variables Entered/Removed
Variables

Variables

Entered

Removed

Model
1

VAR00002

a

b

Method
. Enter

a. All requested variables entered.
b. Dependent Variable: VAR00001

Model Summary

Model

R

1

.854

R Square
a

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.730

.460

10.14346

a. Predictors: (Constant), VAR00002

b

ANOVA
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

277.993

1

277.993

Residual

102.890

1

102.890

Total

380.883

2

F

Sig.

2.702

.348

a

a. Predictors: (Constant), VAR00002
b. Dependent Variable: VAR00001

Coefficients

a

Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
1

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

32.259

7.726

VAR00002

229.982

139.914

a. Dependent Variable: VAR00001
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Coefficients
Beta

t

.854

Sig.

4.176

.150

1.644

.348

Appendix Two: Marion Oaks NSP Properties
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Appendix Three: Silver Springs Shores NSP Properties
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Appendix Four: Rainbow Park NSP Properties
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